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Music, Time and Being – The Constitution of the Heideggerian Mousiké

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Abstract

This article offers a philosophical reflection on the concept of music within the framework of Martin Heidegger's thought. It argues that music can be understood as an immediate articulation of time, drawing upon Heidegger's major works: *The Concept of Time*, *Being and Time*, *Time and Being*, *Nietzsche*, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, and *On the Way to Language*. Through these readings, the article develops the hypothesis that music expresses the category of time insofar as time essentially constitutes its structure. The aim is to investigate how music, from a Heideggerian perspective, transcends its merely aesthetic or expressive dimensions and takes on an ontological significance. In this context, music is interpreted as *mousiké*, the original Greek conception that integrates sound, rhythm, word, and gesture as a unified act of sense-making. Music, thus, is approached as *lógos*—the revealing word that grants meaning to being through language. The argument unfolds in three sections: first, an analysis of the concept of time in Heidegger's philosophy; second, an exploration of time as a structural component of beings; and third, a discussion of music's essential connection with time and its relation to the Heideggerian notion of *mousiké*. The article concludes that music, within Heidegger's ontology, serves as a primordial manifestation of temporality and participates in the revelation of being through language and silence.

Keywords: Heidegger; Music; Time

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1. Introduction

Time occupies a fundamental role in Martin Heidegger's philosophical project. The central thesis of *Being and Time*—that the meaning of being is given through time—permeates a wide range of his writings on diverse themes. In this respect, Heidegger remains in dialogue with major figures such as Heraclitus, Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, and Husserl, each of whom, in their own historical contexts, assigned a strategically significant role to the category of time within their systems of thought.

Building upon this broader framework, this article proposes that Heidegger's understanding of music may be interpreted as an originary articulation of the relationship between time and being. Although Heidegger does not explicitly formulate this thesis, his reflections on poetry and language suggest that music participates essentially in the ontological structure of being. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how this conception of music is implicitly present within Heidegger's central ideas, culminating in the notion of logos as articulated in his lectures on language.

To develop this argument, the article is structured into three sections. Part I analyzes the concept of time in Heidegger's philosophy, focusing on: (a) time as the existential dimension of Dasein; (b) the distinction between ontic and ontological time; (c) the relation between time and the meaning of being through anticipation; and (d) historical temporality. Part II reflects on the presence of time as an ecstatic instant within the structure of beings, illuminating the distinction between physis and meaning as fundamental components of truth and logos. Part III elaborates on the essential connection between music, time, and being, advancing the interpretation of music as *mousiké* in Heidegger's thought.

2. Meanings of Time in Heidegger's Philosophy

Initially, time is conceived as a dimension of existence: "Time, then, would be myself, and each would be time. And we, in our being with one another, would be time... none of us and each one" ^[1]. There is no a priori timeless condition; there is no principle that grounds existence without participating in it. As proposed in *Being and*

Time (1927), Dasein (being-there) is the human being who exists and inexorably moves through time, according to its constitutive parts: the existentials (*Existenzial*)—facticity, understanding, interpretation, and discourse—which, as conditions of possibility for categories, enable Dasein to understand being (ontological); and the existentiells (*Existenziell*)—conduct, commerce, and care—which directly concern Dasein's connection with being (ontic), that is, with the realm of everyday existence, understood here as referring to the domain of beings—that which can appear in language, including language itself—while Being, in contrast, is the indeterminate that grounds the possibility of naming and understanding beings. Once projected into time, Dasein exists within language and culture. This existence, as well as the perception of time linked to it, is embedded in a pre-understanding of Being ^[2].

There is a correspondence between the dimensions of time and the constitutive parts of Dasein: the past corresponds to the factual immersion of Dasein in the world; the future corresponds to understanding and interpretation, which sustain discursivity; and the present corresponds to falling (behavior/*Verhalten*, relationship/*Beziehung*, and care/*Sorge*), that is, how Dasein exists in its everyday engagement with the world. This correspondence among the constitutive parts of Dasein enables the distinction between ontic and ontological times ^[3]. Ontic time is conceived within the dominance of the conception of being as presence. It expresses an infinite succession of now-points, with the past and future reduced, respectively, to what-has-been and what-is-to-come. Ontic time also expresses an incursion into the realm of temporality that allows, starting from a reference point, the establishment of dates and, consequently, a chain of meaningful connections. Thus, ontic time articulates everyday language, characteristics of philosophy and science.

On the other hand, ontological time manifests the ecstatic articulation of its own dimensions: future, past, and present—in that order. It belongs to the openness of being, which, as an indeterminacy, sustains the projective horizon of Dasein's self-understanding and its understanding of surrounding beings. Ontological time allows Dasein to anticipate in relation to the present and to intuit the plurality of meanings of being. Therefore, ontological time is the temporal condition of the poetic dimension of language,

where the meaning of being is not fixed but remains in a state of continual openness. It is ontological time that sustains poetic discourse, characterizing it as a mode that situates Dasein within the realm of polysemy.

The comparison between Heidegger and Husserl is pertinent, although by the time of *Being and Time*, Heidegger's thought had already acquired its specificity as a philosophy of ontological difference. In *Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Internal Time-Consciousness*, Husserl argues that objects of "temporal extension" could not be intended if consciousness were limited to grasping only discrete now-moments. In such a case, only objects present in an exact moment could be apprehended. Objects with temporal extension, such as a melody, require a different mode of apprehension. Indeed, melody is frequently taken as a paradigm for observing time. From this, the distinction emerges between the modes of apprehending temporal objects: (1) Primal Impression (now phase); (2) Retention (past phase); and (3) Protention (future, anticipation phase) ^[4].

Partly, Heidegger follows Husserl's reasoning:

"And yet, even this no-longer-present presents itself immediately in its absenting, namely, in the mode of 'having been' and addresses us. This does not disappear from the former now, like the purely past. What has been presented itself, however, in its own way. In what has been, presenting is achieved. But the absenting also addresses us, in the sense of the not-yet-present, in the sense of coming towards us (Heidegger, 1991, p. 212)."

However, a fundamental difference is observed: for Husserl, the constitution of time from the intention of the past is related to being as it manifests in the present. For Heidegger, by contrast, the constitution of time is linked to being conceived as anticipation, a process that occurs primarily through Dasein's experience of existential anxiety (*Angst*). This condition disrupts the comfortable absorption of Dasein in the network of instrumental references that characterize everyday life, wherein it forgets its own ontic existence. *Angst* alienates Dasein from this state, enabling it to perceive the collapse of the familiar worldly order. It

becomes a radical experience when it reveals the possibility of non-existence, signaling the unequivocal possibility of a being ceasing to be within the dimension of presence. In this state, *Angst* makes Dasein aware of its condition as a "being-towards-death," thereby recognizing its ontic finitude.

Angst positions Dasein before the indeterminate, compelling it to choose between taking refuge in the triviality of everyday life or transcending it by assuming its projective character ^[2]. Through the recognition of this character, Dasein incorporates the future into its self-understanding. Consequently, Dasein anticipates death as its most extreme possibility, thereby affirming itself in its own potentiality-for-Being: "Decision recovers presence for its own most Being-possible. It is in the understanding of Being-towards-death as the most proper possibility that one's own Being-possible becomes fully transparent in its propriety" ^[5].

The anticipatory decision emerges from a fundamental nexus between being and temporality. Insofar as Dasein exists as a being that anticipates death, the temporal dimension of the future becomes decisive for its projection in time and, consequently, in history. The perspective of the future displaces Dasein from the past—specifically, from the factual situation in which it originally finds itself—bringing it into the present as the synthesis of the entirety of its own existence:

"We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the 'ekstases' of temporality. Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from itself; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ekstases. What is characteristic of the 'time' which is accessible to the ordinary understanding, consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure sequence of 'nows', without beginning and without end." ^[1]

In the ecstatic synthesis, the perspective of the future grants Dasein the understanding that it ontologically moves in time, defining the present as an articulation of its

factual past and its own future. Therefore, Dasein is not configured solely by what it originally was, but rather by its potentiality-for-being, expressed in the temporal dimension of presence. Its existence is transcendent; through the exercise of imaginative understanding, Dasein appropriates its potentiality-for-being, navigating the dimensions of time. Equipped with this mode of self-understanding, Dasein can also comprehend the world not only as it was or is in the present, but also as it might have been or may come to be. This is the central thesis of *Being and Time*: the meaning of being is time. It is time that grounds the comprehensibility of beings in their co-belonging with being. This is because Dasein, for whom being opens as a naming and signifying possibility, possesses a historical character, and its historicity consists in existing as the embryonic unfolding of the future, in the past that endures in the present.

3. Time in the Structure of Being

A fundamental element of the essay *The Origin of the Work of Art* is that Heidegger makes works of art a field of observation for phenomena that concern the totality of being. Although the essay only received its final form in the 1950s, the reflections it contains date back to the early 1930s. Notably, the description of the Greek temple—which in the published version appears after the analysis of Van Gogh's painting—was originally conceived around 1932. These historical layers suggest a progression of thought: first, a reflection on the original connection between truth, language, and the movement of *phýsis*, which underlies the temple description; then, in the analysis of Van Gogh's painting, a characterization of the artwork as a phenomenon that surpasses instrumental logic; and finally, in the appreciation of the *Poem of the Roman Fountain*, a deepening of the reflection on the poetic dimension of language. He proceeds in this manner, motivated by one of his conclusions in *Being and Time*, specifically that the sense of being is obscured by Dasein's inclination to live in ontic temporality. In this regard, the discussion on the "thingly aspect" of the work of art is pertinent, defined as the conceptual pair matter-form; historically, this pair, since Aristotle's philosophy, has represented the structure of being and has thus underpinned traditional theories of art and aesthetics^[6]. When describing works of art, Heidegger rejects this definition and promotes a strategic conceptual

shift; he no longer refers simply to the matter-form pair. Instead, he proposes, respectively, the Earth (*Die Erde*) and a world (*eine Welt*), where the Earth is the *phýsis*, that is, matter understood as the totality of its formal (projective) potentialities, and the world is the ensemble of meanings that stabilize in a given form. Thus, by adopting this conceptual pair, Heidegger integrates the projective character of being into the understanding of the structure of being.

As can be seen in the description of the work, *A Pair of Peasant Shoes* by Van Gogh. In this work, the peasant depicted does not think about the shoes he is wearing, as he conceives them as a "being of reliability" (*die Verlässlichkeit*). The peasant simply trusts the shoes, as he intuitively (anticipates) the adequacy of the material (*phýsis*) to the end determined for it; this even allows him to be absorbed in the ensemble of meanings that constitute his world. The being of reliability directly refers to the intuition we have of the material (*phýsis*) in its becoming. It is the being grasped in its projective character. Thus, Van Gogh's painting discloses the being of reliability as a fundamental mode of apprehending *phýsis*^[6].

The concept of being of reliability (*die Verlässlichkeit*) highlights that time is a component of what is intuited as the potentiality of *phýsis*, thus participating in the stature of a being that has been individuated in a form. This idea becomes clearer as the thesis that truth unfolds in the work of art is articulated. As seen in the description of the Temple of Paestum, the Earth, conceived as *phýsis*, retains the projective character of being, since it concerns the ensemble of formal potentialities of matter. As it takes on a form, it withdraws into itself, concealing itself and, at the same time, allowing the form to appear, thereby founding a world of meanings^[3].

The mechanism that facilitates this interplay between the revealing of a world and the concealing of the Earth is strife (*der Streit*), which constitutes the character of visibility in the work. In this context, *der Streit* marks a shift from the traditional notion of dialogical play, emphasizing instead the irreducible tension between opposing forces and the absence of a reconciling synthesis. This strife does not result in the suppression of one element in favor of another, much less in a synthesis through which the conflicting parts disappear in favor of a third. In the work of art, strife allows the Earth and the world to be and to show

themselves in their dignity. The conflicting parts affirm each other reciprocally because one cannot become visible without the other; the visibility of the world relies on the reliability of the Earth, and the visibility of the Earth is given by the openness of the world. Therefore, strife does not cease, making the work strange to beings in general. This strangeness is the aspect of the work ^[6]. According to Heidegger, the perception of this aspect defines the event of truth. It occurs in an ecstatic temporal instant called the trace (*der Riss*). In the Brazilian translation, *der Riss* is rendered as “traço” (meaning “trace” or “mark”), while in the Portuguese translation it appears as “rasgão” (meaning “tear” or “gash”), referring specifically to a rupture of light. In this latter sense, the idea of *Prester*—the lightning of Zeus, symbolizing divine insight—becomes more evident, which appears to align with the interpretation Heidegger intends ^[7]. In the clarity of this instant, the conflicting parts that produce it—namely, the Earth and a world—can be apprehended, as they categorically show themselves ^[6]. In a word, the trace is a temporal instant in which the essential *gestalt* of the structure of being can be perceived, allowing it to be seen as a composite whose parts have not been entirely subsumed into the meanings of a form. Thus, time is no longer taken as a measure of subjectivity, as traditionally conceived. Time, as a dimension of existence, participates in the totality of being that speaks for itself precisely in the openness it produces. Participating in being, time will also be a constitutive part of artworks, language, and, notably, music.

4. Music, Time, and Being: The Structure of Logos in Language

In the final section of *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger refers briefly to poetry, characterizing it as a privileged mode of projecting truth. Poetry, understood as *poiesis* in the strict sense, holds a distinct position within the totality of the arts ^[6].

Unlike other arts, poetry operates directly within language, the locus where the future precedes the present and opens the horizon of meaning. In this respect, poetry establishes itself as a fundamental modality for the apprehension of *physis*—the dynamic unfolding of being. Its primacy is not merely due to its material, language, but to its capacity to disclose being through naming and signify-

ing.

It may be asked whether poetry is the most poetic of the arts because its material is language. Since language is the dwelling place of the poetic (being), when it becomes a work of art, it performs what it possesses most essentially—namely, being in its broad capacity to bestow name and meaning to the entity ^[6]. However, the argument concerning the predominance of poetry over other arts concludes with this line of reasoning. The reason that leads Heidegger to hold such an opinion is clarified more fully in *On the Way to Language*, where Heidegger considers poetry the most eminent among the arts because he understands that it is ontologically supported by music.

This postulate aligns with Heidegger’s understanding that music reveals the category of time, demonstrating his connection to the German philosophical tradition and phenomenology, which, especially since Kant, have placed the categories of time and space at the highest hierarchical level. It is important to note that Husserl made music a privileged field of observation, considering it a temporal object that provides access to consciousness of time itself ^[8]. Thus, being an expression of the category of time, music can, as Heidegger asserts, situate itself between the word and the thing, establishing, through rhythm, sense, and meaning in language. In other words, as an immediate expression of the category of time, music is *mousiké* (*lógos*).

Listening to being is a fundamental orientation in Heidegger’s texts on language. It corresponds to the imperative that guides reflections in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, namely: letting things speak for themselves. Listening to being can be understood as listening to the entity that immediately expresses its meaning. From the perspective of experience, it is evident that music gains stature in time. Acknowledging this, James Tenney asks whether music is deduced from time or whether time is deduced from music ^[9]. This is analogous to Heidegger’s formulation; by positing the thesis that time is the sense of being, he acknowledges the primordial hermeneutic circle: “Being and time determine each other; in such a way, however, that the former—being—cannot be approached as temporal, nor the latter—time—as entity-like” ^[10].

Being an expression of the category of time, music holds the condition of its connection with thought and language, namely, music is thought. François Nicolas, al-

though operating within a different conceptual universe, reaches a similar conclusion, expanding it into a statement that could be aligned with Heidegger's position if he had considered specific musical works: "the musical work is the place of the thought of music"^[11]. Although Heidegger rarely refers to specific musical pieces, some examples can be found, such as the *Allegro* from Bach's Third Brandenburg Concerto, the final *Adagio* of Beethoven's *Piano Sonata No. 32*, Op. 111, Carl Orff's *Antigone*, and Stravinsky's *Symphony of Psalms* and *Persephone*^[12]. In *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger makes occasional use of musical vocabulary—mentioning song, *basso continuo*, melody, harmony, consonant, and dissonant—but he does not integrate these terms into analyses of particular compositions. Rather, his reflections approach a general notion of music, increasingly tied to his ontological concept of Being.

The musical work is the site of music's thought; that is, it thinks time in its ontic and ontological dimensions. It is noteworthy to mention the association between musical time and historical time in Hegel, proposed by the philosopher Gisele Brelet: the time of the sonata form has a structure analogous to Hegelian dialectics, namely, the contrast between opposites and the synthesis resulting from this contrast^[13]. In a similar line of thought, Koellreutter claims a comparable type of association by comparing musical systems to the perception of time prevailing in periods marking history. In summary, Koellreutter associates the modal system with the circular perception of time typical of the Middle Ages. The tonal system corresponds to the linear perception typical of modernity. On the other hand, the atonal and aleatory musical systems are seen as disrupting the historical course of thought by expressing new types of temporal perception, namely, block and relative perceptions^[14].

The consideration that there is a necessary connection between musical systems and time, affecting the musical phenomenon in both its extrinsic and intrinsic structures, entails a consequence: when a composer chooses the system from which to compose, they impart to the structure of musical discourse the inherent temporal ordering. Conversely, music situates listeners within a perception of time as it expresses its structure. Thus, Koellreutter argues that music expresses a dual conception of time: the linear,

which he identifies with the temporality inherent in logical thought, and the qualitative time, analogous to Heidegger's ontological time, which embodies the idea of anticipation at its core^[14].

It can be argued that any musician would accept the proposition that in music, time moves in ekstasis, allowing listeners to anticipate phenomena and generate expectations about what has been anticipated. This type of temporal experience has, over the years, enabled the emergence of analytical models and theories, exemplified by Meyer's theory on the production of emotion and musical meaning^[15]. According to Meyer, the anticipatory experience of time enables the synthetic listening of structures and forms. From this listening, expectations arise. These expectations, whether fulfilled or not, produce emotion and meaning. This occurs precisely because anticipation underpins the perception of linear progression. Put in Heideggerian terms, ontological time supports the perception of ontic time. This is precisely what constitutes the ontological states of works, which have become the object of descriptive approaches by scholars such as David Greene, Joseph Smith, and Michael Pelt. These authors developed descriptive methods in music analysis that focus on listening and on the formal and expressive structure of works. Their mention here highlights the importance of listening as a means of accessing the ontological dimension of music, as proposed in the present analysis^[16].

Understood as a thought constituted by time, music is essentially identified with being, which, as indeterminacy, opens up the experience of polysemous naming; thus, music participates in language, transforming itself from its own constitution into *mousiké*. In its most archaic sense, *mousiké* is the original solidarity between grammar and mathematics, which involves, among other components, harmony, rhythmicity, and meter—everything that has time as a condition of possibility^[17]. Or, as proposed by Lia Tomás, in a more general sense, *mousiké* is the constitutive precondition of music itself^[18]. In such meanings, *mousiké* is both the limit and the condition for apprehending the phenomenal world; to suppose anything prior to it would be to enter the realm of metaphysics. From this perspective, it can be stated that the hermeneutics of language proposed by Heidegger has made *mousiké* its horizon of discursive interpellation.

In the conferences compiled under the title *On the Way to Language*, the guiding question is to inquire into what language is in itself, stripped of preconceptions that define it. With the aim of reflecting on the meaning of language, Heidegger, in accordance with his hermeneutics, takes a work of art as a privileged point of observation. The work examined is Georg Trakl's poem *Winter Evening*. From the description of this poem, Heidegger establishes the thesis that the essence of language is speech in the following ways: (1) language names, that is, brings being into presence; (2) language presents a world of meanings by objectifying things; (3) language brings forth the difference between meaning and thing^[19].

To bring forth the difference (*Unterschied*) between meaning and thing; what is stated about the word converted into art is analogous to what is stated about works of art in general. Truth in poetry occurs as a non-synthesis between the word and the named thing, that is, as the combat (*der Streit*) that does not cease. Truth is established between the thing and its meaning, in the moment that allows the inference of the difference between being and entity, which Heidegger now calls: the consonance of stillness (*Stille*), understood here as an approximation between the senses of silence and quietude—a sonic pause within language, corresponding to nothingness.

The consonance of stillness is the way language shows its vigor (*Wesen*); the gathering call that evokes world (meaning) and thing^[19]. Gathering call: *lógos*. *Mousiké*. There is a resonance between Heraclitus' thought (Frag. 50) and that of Heidegger: "listening not to me, but to the *lógos*, it is wise to agree that all is one"^[7]. Heraclitus suggests being attentive to what the *lógos* says. Only by carefully obeying the invocation of the *lógos* can one listen to the unity between thought and thing in language.

Lógos, *mousiké*, or, in Heraclitean terms, *harmoníe*; the reference to music is always necessary when addressing Greek thought. In Fragment LXXV (DK B51), Heraclitus states: "Opposition brings concord. Out of discord comes the fairest harmony, and all things happen by strife"^[7]. Also, in Fragment LXXVIII (DK B54a): "They do not understand how that which differs with itself is in agreement: harmony consists of opposing tension, like that of the bow and the lyre"^[7]. Music demonstrates that in synthesis, the difference of the parts that have been synthesized persists

and reveals itself; as stated in Fragment CXXIX (DK B10): "Out of all things comes one, and out of one all things"^[7]. Kahn highlights the meanings that the terms *consonant* and *dissonant* acquire in Heraclitus' description of *lógos*; the *consonant* (*synaidon*) and the *dissonant* (*diaidon*) are united in the cognitive act that joins, synthesizes, and leads to understanding (*syllapsies*). *Consonant* (*synaidon*) is to sing together. *Dissonant* (*diaidon*) is to sing separately, as in a contest^[7].

The *lógos* presents the sense of speaking as the gathering of all that is in language. It makes "present" the unity between word and thing, so that in speaking and showing it triggers the phenomenon (*phainómenon*); to make shine, to bring to light what shows itself. Insofar as it allows the phenomenon to come forth, it corresponds to the essential presence of being. Thus, inspired by Heraclitus, Heidegger posits that the consonance of the quiet is the gathering posture. It is *lógos* or *mousiké* in the sense of *Legen*^[19].

The gathering posture is a way of listening to language, namely: "anticipating while reserving." Now, anticipating while reserving occurs directly in accordance with the category of time. There is an unequivocal reference to the main thesis of *Being and Time*, namely, that the sense of being is the ekstasis of time: the future (anticipating) gathers the past in the present (reserving). Consequently, there is an essential articulation between listening and being. It is in the exercise of listening that the poet (*Dasein*) appropriates the difference between meaning and thing and begins to dwell in language^[19]. Comparing the lectures on language with the essay *The Origin of the Work of Art*, the following reasoning can be advanced: being *mousiké*, music is the "being between" sound and meaning. Therefore, unlike other arts, it generically has the condition for the happening of truth, namely, the production of the ecstatic moment called trace (*der Riss*). In this sense, Heidegger is speaking of any and every music, not of a particular work.

In language, the poet is seized by the enthusiasm (*Geist*) that emanates from music and engages in *saga* (*sage*), precisely by considering the difference between entity and being, leading language beyond its communicative function. *Saga* consists in treading the path where the poet is called to position themselves between the said and the unsaid of language. In this place, the poet acknowledges dependence on being to grant the appropriate word to des-

ignite the thing, knowing that where the sign fails, there is no signified thing. In summary, the *saga* is to situate oneself in the consonance of quiet^[19].

In the *saga*, the poet-singer forsakes the relationship between word and thing to traverse the path of the *field* (*Der Feldweg*) and reach stillness^[19], where music is the affective ground (*melos*) that provides all activities of sense and significance; in poetic terms: when the feast of the gods' arrival occurs. In this celebration, the poet-singer acts as the mediator who brings the messages of the gods to mortals and ascends to heaven to carry mortals' prayers. Thus, the poet-singer inaugurates myth, marking an origin (*arché*) but without initiating a linear temporality^[20]. This is how music essentializes language. Where language fails in the incompleteness of an ontic meaning, music accesses being in its fullest vigor, in the opening of poetic indeterminacy^[19].

The junction between music and thought in poetry implies dwelling in the quadrature (*Geviert*) formed between heaven, earth, mortals, and immortals^[6]. To dwell in the quadrature is to remain within the trace that separates the voice of the god from its subjective decoding, allowing things to show themselves as they are, as *aletheia*. Dwelling in the quadrature is to allow oneself to be possessed by language, plunging into the abyss (*Abgrund*) where possibilities of opening and veiling the truth of being lie^[2]. It is to acknowledge finitude and to decide on one's existential possibility in the space of indetermination of the word—that is, in the music that makes language poetic, notwithstanding the determinative force of the sign.

Reflecting on the original meaning of the sign, Heidegger problematizes the conception that language is a vocal sound, as deduced from Aristotle's treatise *De Interpretatione* (*Arist., Int.*, 16a3). This conception aligns with the thesis that language is established by convention, a strategic thesis for establishing the primacy of the subject in philosophy. In contrast to this thesis, Heidegger returns to the pre-Socratic notion that language has an original connection with *Phýsis*. This notion led Aristotle himself to characterize dialects as modes of the mouth. However, Heidegger reinterprets this, which can be understood as relating it to the traditional modes that structure the chants of peoples. Heidegger provisionally concludes his argument by paraphrasing the poet Hölderlin, stating that language is the bloom of the mouth^[19].

Language is the flower of the mouth insofar as its sign silences itself like music. Of particular note is the ontological nature of rhythm. It is rhythm, the most genuine expression of the category of time, that lends strangeness to the poem, making it foreign in relation to everyday language while bodily connecting it to the course of thought. Rhythm articulates the movement of thought, as it does with dance and singing (*Mousiké*). Heidegger refers not only to rhythm understood as the mere temporal arrangement of sounds within a given limit. The rhythm that gives ontological character to the poem is that which allows it to be recognized as a work that rests within itself but is articulated within a totality^[19]. At this point, the expanded (traditional) concept of *mousiké* is employed, referring to a multisensory poetics. Lia Tomás' observation on contemporary *mousiké* is relevant, presenting it as a dynamic integral process involving singing, speech, dance, onomatopoeias, bodily expressions, theatrical representations, and a wide range of noises and silences^[18].

Silence is the substance of music. It is the preceding absence of meaningful activity that allows human beings to establish their dominion over beings. In silenced thought, Dasein is the shepherd (*Hirte*) of being^[21]. This thought occurs in the realm of listening. It is important to note that Benedito Nunes emphasizes the distinction between listening and hearing in the context of Heidegger's philosophy. Listening is an act that precedes hearing; it presupposes silence. In silence, one perceives understanding within the affective field established by music^[22].

5. Conclusions

Music, as understood in Heidegger's philosophy, is articulated as an immediate expression of time and thus manifests being through language. Although Heidegger does not state this thesis explicitly, this inference can be drawn from key texts such as *The Concept of Time, Being and Time, Time and Being*, and *Nietzsche*. Throughout this article, the argument has been developed and structured in three movements.

In the first part, the argument examined the idea that time, for Heidegger, is an existential dimension rather than a subjective construct. Ontic time corresponds to linear succession, dominated by presence. Ontological time, in contrast, is an ecstatic projection—past, present, and future

interwoven—which opens the horizon of meaning and poetic language.

In the second part, the argument demonstrated how time participates in the structure of beings. It reveals the essential conflict between matter and form and plays a central role in the occurrence of truth, especially in artworks and language. Time is no longer external to being but constitutes its projective movement.

In the third part, the argument examined the relation between music and language. Music, as an expression of time, functions as *mousiké*: the originary *lógos* that allows beings to be named and understood. Through rhythm and temporal unfolding, music grounds the poetic dimension of language and truth.

It can be concluded that music, in Heidegger's thought, is not merely an aesthetic phenomenon but a structural articulation of being and time. As such, it participates in the ontological unfolding of language and opens a path to the poetic manifestation of truth.

Author Contributions

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Conflicts of Interest

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