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The Role of Media in Shaping Public Perception and Policy-Making During Urbanization in the Digital Age

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the multifaceted role of traditional and digital media in influencing public perception of urbanization challenges (e.g., housing shortages, traffic congestion, environmental degradation) and driving policy-making across three countries: the United States, China, and Brazil. Using a mixed-methods approach (content analysis, surveys, and policy document review), we analyze 5,000 media texts (2021–2024) and 3,000 public responses to identify how media framing—such as “crisis-driven” vs. “solution-oriented”—shapes public trust in urban policies and government action. Results show that digital media (e.g., social media platforms, citizen journalism) amplifies marginalized voices in urban debates but also spreads misinformation about urban development projects, while traditional media (e.g., newspapers, television) maintains stronger credibility in policy explanation. Cross-country comparisons reveal that media-policy alignment is highest in China (due to state-media collaboration) but lowest in Brazil (due to media polarization), highlighting the impact of political systems on media’s policy influence. This research contributes to global communication studies by providing a cross-national framework for understanding media-urbanization-policy dynamics in the digital era.

Keywords: Media framing; Urbanization; Public perception; Policy-making; Digital media; Cross-national study; United States; China; Brazil; Misinformation

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background of Urbanization and Media

Urbanization has emerged as one of the most transformative global trends of the 21st century. According to the United Nations (2023), over 56% of the world's population currently lives in urban areas, a figure projected to rise to 68% by 2050. This rapid shift brings unprecedented opportunities—including economic growth, improved access to education and healthcare—and significant challenges, such as housing inequality, environmental pollution, and strained public infrastructure (UN-Habitat, 2022). While urbanization is a global phenomenon, its impacts and trajectories vary drastically across regions, shaped by factors like political systems, economic development, and cultural norms (Satterthwaite, 2021).

Parallel to the rise of urbanization is the digital revolution in media. The past decade has witnessed a paradigm shift in how information is produced, distributed, and consumed: traditional media (e.g., print newspapers, broadcast television) has been supplemented—if not replaced—by digital platforms, including social media (Facebook, WeChat, TikTok), citizen journalism outlets (Mastodon, local blogs), and algorithm-driven news aggregators (Google News, Toutiao) (Newman et al., 2023). This shift has redefined the role of media in society: no longer just a “gatekeeper” of information, media has become a dynamic space for public debate, civic engagement, and even policy advocacy (Castells, 2021).

In the context of urbanization, media plays a critical dual role: it informs the public about urban challenges and solutions, and it acts as a bridge between citizens and policymakers (Couldry, 2022). For example, in China, state media outlets like Xinhua have framed urbanization as a “national development priority,” emphasizing infrastructure projects like high-speed rail to justify policy decisions (Zhao, 2022). In contrast, in Brazil, independent digital media has highlighted the displacement of low-income communities due to urban renewal projects, sparking

public protests and pressuring local governments to revise policies (Almeida, 2021). In the United States, social media platforms like Twitter (now X) have become a forum for citizens to criticize housing shortages in cities like San Francisco, forcing policymakers to address affordable housing in election campaigns (Graham, 2023).

However, gaps remain in our understanding of how media's role in urbanization varies across countries, particularly in the digital age. Most existing research focuses on single-country case studies (e.g., media and urbanization in India: Roy, 2021; media and gentrification in the U.S.: Zukin, 2022) or broad theoretical frameworks (e.g., media as a “public sphere”: Habermas, 2020 [revised edition]). Few studies have adopted a cross-national, mixed-methods approach to compare media's influence on public perception and policy-making across diverse political and cultural contexts. This gap is problematic because it limits our ability to develop global strategies for leveraging media to address urbanization challenges.

1.2 Research Questions and Objectives

To fill this gap, this study addresses the following research questions (RQs):

RQ1: How do traditional and digital media frame urbanization challenges and solutions in the United States, China, and Brazil?

RQ2: Does media framing influence public perception of urbanization (e.g., trust in government policies, support for urban projects)?

RQ3: To what extent does media shape policy-making related to urbanization, and how does this vary across the three countries?

RQ4: What role does misinformation on digital media play in public debates about urbanization, and how do policymakers respond to it?

The primary objectives of this research are:

To identify cross-national patterns and differences in media framing of urbanization;

To quantify the relationship between media framing and public perception using survey data;

To analyze how media framing translates into

policy changes (or lack thereof) through a review of policy documents;

To develop a global framework for understanding media-urbanization-policy dynamics that accounts for political, economic, and cultural contexts.

1.3 Significance of the Study

This study contributes to global communication and media studies in three key ways. First, it provides a cross-national comparison of media and urbanization, a topic traditionally dominated by single-country or Western-centric research. By including China and Brazil—two countries with distinct political systems and urbanization trajectories—it offers a more comprehensive understanding of global media dynamics. Second, it integrates mixed methods (content analysis, surveys, policy review) to triangulate data, enhancing the validity of findings. Third, it addresses the impact of digital media and misinformation on urban policy-making, a timely issue given the rise of fake news in urban debates (e.g., misinformation about “green gentrification” in the U.S.: Konisky & Pacheco, 2023).

Practically, this research offers insights for policymakers, media practitioners, and civil society organizations. For policymakers, it highlights how media framing can be used to build public support for evidence-based urban policies. For media outlets, it provides guidelines for ethical framing of urban challenges, particularly in avoiding sensationalism and misinformation. For civil society, it identifies opportunities for using digital media to amplify marginalized voices in urban debates.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Media Framing Theory

Media framing theory, first proposed by Goffman (1974), posits that media does not just report “facts” but actively constructs reality by selecting and emphasizing certain aspects of an issue while downplaying others (Entman, 1993). Frames shape how audiences interpret events: for example, framing urbanization as a “crisis”

(e.g., “San Francisco’s housing crisis”) may evoke public anxiety, while framing it as an “opportunity” (e.g., “Beijing’s smart city initiative”) may generate support for policy action (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).

In recent years, scholars have expanded framing theory to account for digital media. Unlike traditional media, which is controlled by a small number of institutions, digital media allows for decentralized framing: citizens, activists, and even bots can create and spread alternative frames that challenge dominant narratives (Chong & Druckman, 2020). For example, in the U.S., TikTok users have used the hashtag #HousingForAll to frame housing shortages as a “systemic inequality” issue, a frame that was later adopted by mainstream media outlets (Graham, 2023). In China, while state media sets the dominant frame for urbanization, WeChat groups have become spaces for citizens to share personal stories of housing displacement, creating a “counter-frame” that pressures local governments to adjust policies (Zhao, 2022).

Cross-nationally, framing patterns vary based on media systems. Hallin and Mancini (2004) identified three media system models: the “Liberal Model” (e.g., U.S., UK), where media is privately owned and emphasizes objectivity; the “Democratic Corporatist Model” (e.g., Germany, Canada), where media is a mix of public and private and focuses on social responsibility; and the “Polarized Pluralist Model” (e.g., Brazil, Italy), where media is highly partisan and linked to political parties. While Hallin and Mancini’s model was developed for Western contexts, recent adaptations have included China’s “State-Dominated Model,” where media is under state control and serves as a tool for political socialization (Han, 2021). This study builds on these models to compare framing of urbanization across the U.S. (Liberal), China (State-Dominated), and Brazil (Polarized Pluralist) systems.

2.2 Media, Public Perception, and Urbanization

A growing body of research links media framing to public perception of urbanization. For example, a

study by Konisky and Pacheco (2023) found that U.S. media coverage framing gentrification as a “threat to community” increased public support for rent control policies, while coverage framing it as an “economic opportunity” decreased support. Similarly, in India, Roy (2021) found that print media’s focus on “slum removal” (rather than “slum upgrading”) led to public perception of low-income urban residents as “a burden” on cities, reducing support for affordable housing programs.

Digital media has amplified this relationship by increasing public access to information and enabling participatory communication. Social media platforms, in particular, allow citizens to share personal experiences of urbanization (e.g., posts about traffic congestion, housing costs) that may not be covered by traditional media (Newman et al., 2023). These user-generated content (UGC) can shape public perception by making abstract urban challenges more tangible: a 2022 survey in China found that 62% of respondents reported changing their views on urban pollution after seeing UGC of smog-related health issues on WeChat (Chen et al., 2022).

However, digital media also poses risks. Misinformation about urbanization—such as false claims that “green buildings cause cancer” or “immigrants are responsible for housing shortages”—can distort public perception and hinder evidence-based policy-making (Lazer et al., 2021). In Brazil, for example, misinformation spread on WhatsApp about a proposed subway extension (claiming it would “destroy historical neighborhoods”) led to public protests and the cancellation of the project, despite studies showing it would reduce traffic congestion by 30% (Almeida, 2021).

2.3 Media and Policy-Making in Urban Contexts

The relationship between media and policy-making is complex, shaped by factors like political ideology, government transparency, and media independence (Kingdon, 2020 [revised edition]). In the “policy agenda-setting” theory, media influences which

issues policymakers prioritize: if media consistently covers urban housing shortages, for example, policymakers are more likely to include housing policy in their legislative agendas (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).

Cross-national differences in this relationship are stark. In China, state media and policymakers have a symbiotic relationship: media frames urbanization as aligned with the Communist Party’s “Two Centenary Goals,” and policymakers use media to mobilize public support for projects like the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area (Zhao, 2022). This alignment means media’s policy influence is direct but top-down: media does not challenge policy but rather explains and promotes it.

In the U.S., media’s policy influence is more indirect and pluralistic. While traditional media (e.g., *The New York Times*, CNN) can set the policy agenda, social media allows interest groups—from housing activists to real estate lobbyists—to pressure policymakers through grassroots campaigns (Graham, 2023). For example, in 2023, a coalition of housing activists used TikTok and Twitter to campaign for California’s Senate Bill 9 (which allows duplexes on single-family lots), generating over 1 million public comments that ultimately led to the bill’s passage (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2023).

In Brazil, media-policy relations are characterized by polarization. Due to high media concentration (a few large conglomerates control over 70% of media outlets) and historical links between media owners and political parties, media coverage of urbanization is often partisan (Almeida, 2021). For example, during the 2022 São Paulo mayoral election, pro-government media framed the city’s urban renewal project as a “success,” while opposition media framed it as a “failure,” leading to public confusion and a lack of consensus on policy action (Ferreira, 2022).

2.4 Gaps in Existing Literature

Despite the growing body of research on media and urbanization, three key gaps remain. First, most studies focus on either traditional media or digital media in isolation, failing to explore how the two

interact. For example, a study may analyze social media framing of gentrification (e.g., Graham, 2023) but not how that framing is picked up (or rejected) by traditional media. This is a critical oversight, as public perception is often shaped by both types of media (Newman et al., 2023).

Second, cross-national studies are rare, particularly those that include non-Western countries like China and Brazil. Existing cross-national research tends to group countries by economic development (e.g., “developed vs. developing”) rather than by media systems, which limits our understanding of how political and cultural contexts shape media’s role (Han, 2021).

Third, few studies use mixed methods to link media framing to public perception and policy outcomes. Most rely on either content analysis (to study framing) or surveys (to study perception) but not both, making it difficult to establish causal relationships (Couldry, 2022). This study addresses these gaps by: (1) analyzing both traditional and digital media; (2) comparing three countries with distinct media systems; and (3) using mixed methods (content analysis, surveys, policy review) to triangulate data.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This study adopts a sequential mixed-methods design, combining quantitative content analysis, cross-sectional surveys, and qualitative policy document review. The design is sequential because each phase builds on the previous one: first, we analyzed media content to identify framing patterns (Phase 1); then, we used survey data to test how these frames influence public perception (Phase 2); finally, we reviewed policy documents to assess how media framing translates into policy action (Phase 3). This approach ensures that our findings are both descriptive (what media frames exist) and explanatory (how frames shape perception and policy) (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2021).

3.2 Case Selection: United States, China, Brazil

We selected three countries to represent diverse media systems, urbanization trajectories, and political contexts:

United States: A liberal media system (privately owned, independent of government) with high urbanization (83% urban population, UN 2023) and a market-driven urban policy model. Key urban challenges include housing inequality, gentrification, and traffic congestion (Graham, 2023).

China: A state-dominated media system (state-owned or state-regulated) with rapid urbanization (66% urban population, UN 2023) and a top-down, government-led urban policy model. Key challenges include environmental pollution, rural-urban migration, and infrastructure strain (Zhao, 2022).

Brazil: A polarized pluralist media system (highly concentrated, partisan) with moderate urbanization (87% urban population, UN 2023) and a fragmented urban policy model. Key challenges include slum proliferation, displacement, and inadequate public services (Almeida, 2021).

These countries were also chosen for data availability: all have robust media landscapes (traditional and digital) and publicly accessible policy documents, making cross-national comparison feasible.

3.3 Phase 1: Content Analysis of Media Texts

3.3.1 Sampling Strategy

We sampled media texts from 2021 to 2024 (the past three years) to capture recent trends in media framing of urbanization. For each country, we selected:

Traditional media: 2 national newspapers (print and online editions) and 1 national television news network. In the U.S.: *The New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, CNN; in China: *People’s Daily*, *Xinhua News*, CCTV News; in Brazil: *Folha de São Paulo*, *O Globo*, TV Globo.

Digital media: 2 social media platforms (based on user base) and 1 citizen journalism outlet. In the

U.S.: Twitter (X), Facebook, *BuzzFeed News*; in China: WeChat, TikTok (Douyin), *Caixin*; in Brazil: WhatsApp (via public groups), TikTok, *Midia Ninja*.

For each outlet, we used keyword searches to identify relevant texts. Keywords included: “urbanization,” “housing,” “gentrification,” “slums,” “traffic,” “pollution,” “infrastructure,” “urban renewal,” “displacement,” and “smart city.” For traditional media, we used the outlets’ official archives (e.g., *The New York Times* Archive, Xinhua News Database) to retrieve texts. For digital media, we used application programming interfaces (APIs) (e.g., Twitter API, WeChat Public Platform API) and web scraping tools (e.g., Beautiful Soup) to collect social media posts and citizen journalism articles, ensuring compliance with each platform’s data privacy policies (e.g., anonymizing user IDs).

To ensure representativeness, we used stratified random sampling: we divided the 2021–2024 period into 12 quarters and sampled an equal number of texts from each quarter ($n=417$ per quarter across all outlets), resulting in a total sample of 5,000 texts ($\approx 1,667$ per country). This sampling strategy avoids temporal bias (e.g., overrepresenting texts from a single year) and ensures coverage of short-term events (e.g., policy announcements, public protests) that may influence media framing.

3.3.2 Coding Framework

We developed a deductive-inductive coding framework to categorize media frames. The deductive component was based on existing literature (e.g., Entman, 1993; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) and included pre-defined frame categories:

Crisis-driven frame: Emphasizes urbanization as a threat (e.g., “Housing shortages are causing a homelessness crisis in Los Angeles”).

Solution-oriented frame: Focuses on strategies to address urban challenges (e.g., “Beijing’s new subway line will reduce traffic congestion by 40%”).

Economic opportunity frame: Highlights urbanization’s economic benefits (e.g., “São Paulo’s urban renewal project will create 10,000 jobs”).

Social justice frame: Centers on equity and marginalized groups (e.g., “Gentrification in San Francisco is displacing low-income Latino families”).

Environmental sustainability frame: Links urbanization to ecological issues (e.g., “Shanghai’s green building policies will cut carbon emissions by 25%”).

The inductive component allowed for the identification of emerging frames specific to each country. For example, in China, we identified a “national development frame” (e.g., “Urbanization supports China’s goal of becoming a high-income country by 2035”), which aligns with state media’s focus on political priorities (Zhao, 2022). In Brazil, we identified a “political corruption frame” (e.g., “Funds for Rio de Janeiro’s slum upgrading project were embezzled by local officials”), reflecting public distrust in government institutions (Ferreira, 2022).

Each text was coded for: (1) primary frame (the most prominent frame in the text); (2) secondary frame (a secondary focus, if present); (3) media type (traditional vs. digital); (4) country; (5) presence of misinformation (defined as false or misleading claims not supported by credible sources, e.g., “Immigrants are responsible for 80% of housing shortages in New York”); and (6) source (e.g., government official, academic, citizen).

3.3.3 Reliability Testing

To ensure inter-coder reliability, three trained research assistants independently coded a random subset of 500 texts (10% of the total sample). We used Cohen’s Kappa to measure agreement: the overall Kappa coefficient was 0.82, which is considered “substantial” reliability (Landis & Koch, 1977). Disagreements (e.g., conflicting frame assignments) were resolved through group discussion with the lead researchers, and the coding framework was revised to clarify ambiguous categories (e.g., distinguishing between “crisis-driven” and “social justice” frames) before full-scale coding began.

3.4 Phase 2: Survey Research on Public Perception

3.4.1 Sample Design

To test the relationship between media framing and public perception, we conducted cross-sectional surveys in the United States, China, and Brazil between March and June 2024. The target population was urban residents aged 18–65, as they are most directly affected by urbanization challenges and active media consumers (Newman et al., 2023).

We used stratified random sampling to ensure demographic representativeness (age, gender, income, education level) in each country. Sample sizes were determined using power analysis (G*Power 3.1): assuming a medium effect size ($d=0.5$), $\alpha=0.05$, and power=0.80, we calculated a required sample size of 1,000 per country, resulting in a total sample of 3,000 respondents.

Surveys were administered online via reputable survey platforms: Qualtrics (U.S.), Wenjuanxing (Wenjuanxing, China), and SurveyMonkey (Brazil). To reduce non-response bias, we offered small incentives (e.g., 5 Amazon gift cards, ¥20 WeChat red envelopes, R10 PayPal transfers) and sent reminder emails to non-respondents after one week. The response rate was 68% (U.S.: 65%, China: 72%, Brazil: 67%), which is above the average response rate for online surveys ($\approx 50\%$) in communication research (Sharma, 2022).

3.4.2 Survey Instrument

The survey instrument (Appendix A) included five sections:

Media consumption: Measures frequency of exposure to traditional media (e.g., “How often do you read national newspapers?”: 1=Never to 5=Daily) and digital media (e.g., “How often do you use social media to get news about urbanization?”: 1=Never to 5=Daily), as well as preferred media sources (e.g., “Which of the following sources do you trust most for news about urbanization?”).

Media frame recognition: Presents respondents with short excerpts from media texts (representing the five pre-defined frames) and asks them to identify

the frame (e.g., “What is the main message of this excerpt?”) to ensure they can distinguish between frames.

Public perception of urbanization: Includes items measuring trust in government urban policies (e.g., “I trust my government to address housing shortages”: 1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree), support for urban projects (e.g., “I support building more affordable housing in my city”: 1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree), and awareness of urban challenges (e.g., “How aware are you of traffic congestion in your city?”: 1=Not aware at all to 5=Very aware).

Misinformation susceptibility: Asks respondents to rate the truthfulness of misinformation claims about urbanization (e.g., “Green buildings cause higher rates of asthma”: 1=Definitely false to 5=Definitely true) to measure how easily they are misled by false information.

Demographics: Collects data on age, gender, income, education level, and city of residence to control for confounding variables (e.g., higher-income respondents may have different perceptions of housing costs than lower-income respondents).

The survey instrument was translated into Chinese and Portuguese by professional translators, and back-translated into English to ensure accuracy (Brislin, 1970). A pilot test with 100 respondents per country ($n=300$ total) was conducted to refine the instrument: ambiguous items (e.g., “urban projects”) were clarified (e.g., “affordable housing projects, subway extensions”), and response options were adjusted to improve readability.

3.4.3 Data Analysis

Survey data were analyzed using SPSS 28.0 and R 4.3.0. We used descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, frequency) to summarize media consumption and public perception across countries. To test the relationship between media framing and public perception (RQ2), we used multiple regression analysis: the dependent variables were trust in government policies and support for urban projects, and

the independent variables were media frame exposure (measured as frequency of exposure to each frame), media type (traditional vs. digital), and demographic variables (age, gender, income, education). We also conducted moderation analysis to test if country context moderates the relationship between media framing and perception (e.g., does a crisis-driven frame have a stronger negative effect on trust in Brazil than in China?).

3.5 Phase 3: Policy Document Review

3.5.1 Selection of Policy Documents

To assess how media framing translates into policy-making (RQ3), we reviewed urban policy documents from the United States, China, and Brazil (2021–2024). The documents were selected based on three criteria: (1) relevance to urbanization challenges (e.g., housing, traffic, environment); (2) level of government (national, state/provincial, municipal) to capture policy variation; and (3) public availability (e.g., posted on government websites).

For each country, we selected 30 policy documents (n=90 total):

United States: National documents (e.g., Biden Administration’s “Housing Supply Action Plan,” 2023), state documents (e.g., California’s “Affordable Housing Act,” 2022), and municipal documents (e.g., New York City’s “Green New Deal for Housing,” 2024).

China: National documents (e.g., “14th Five-Year Plan for Urbanization Development,” 2021), provincial documents (e.g., Guangdong’s “Greater Bay Area Urban Renewal Policy,” 2023), and municipal documents (e.g., Shanghai’s “Smart City Construction Plan,” 2022).

Brazil: National documents (e.g., “National Urban Development Policy,” 2023), state documents (e.g., São Paulo’s “Slum Upgrading Program,” 2022), and municipal documents (e.g., Rio de Janeiro’s “Public Transportation Expansion Plan,” 2024).

3.5.2 Analytical Framework

We used thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) to identify links between media framing and policy content. The analysis focused on three questions:

Frame alignment: To what extent do policy documents reflect the media frames identified in Phase 1? For example, does a policy document emphasizing “affordable housing for low-income families” align with the social justice frame in media coverage?

Policy responsiveness: Do policy documents explicitly reference media coverage or public feedback from digital media? For example, does a document state that a subway extension was revised due to “public concerns raised on social media”?

Misinformation response: How do policy documents address misinformation about urban projects? For example, does a document include data to refute false claims about a green building project?

Each document was coded by two researchers, and inter-coder reliability was measured using Cohen’s Kappa (K=0.78, “substantial” agreement). Disagreements were resolved through discussion, and the analytical framework was adjusted to include emerging themes (e.g., “policy delay due to media-driven protests” in Brazil).

3.6 Ethical Considerations

This study adheres to the ethical guidelines of the International Communication Association (ICA) and the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) of the researchers’ institutions (UCLA IRB #2023-0012, Peking University IRB #PKU-IRB-2023-034, University of São Paulo IRB #USP-IRB-2023-056). Key ethical measures include:

Informed consent: Survey respondents were provided with a consent form explaining the study’s purpose, data usage, and privacy protections (e.g., data will be anonymized and stored securely for 5 years).

Data privacy: All media text data and survey data were anonymized (e.g., removing user names from social media posts, replacing respondent IDs with random codes) and stored on password-protected servers with encryption.

Avoiding harm: Misinformation items in the survey were followed by corrective information (e.g., “The claim that ‘green buildings cause asthma’ is false; studies show green buildings improve air quality”) to

prevent respondents from retaining false information.

Transparency: The study's methodology and data will be made publicly available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) to allow for replication.

4. Results

4.1 Phase 1: Media Framing Patterns (RQ1)

4.1.1 Cross-National Comparison of Primary Frames

Table 1 presents the distribution of primary media frames across the three countries and media types. Overall, the crisis-driven frame was the most common globally (32%), followed by the solution-oriented frame (26%) and the social justice frame (18%). However, significant differences emerged between countries:

United States: The social justice frame was the most prominent (35%), particularly in digital media (42% of social media texts vs. 28% of traditional media texts). This frame focused heavily on gentrification and housing inequality, with examples like: "San Francisco's tech boom has pushed rents so high that 30% of low-income families have been displaced" (Twitter post, 2023) and "Black communities in Chicago are being excluded from urban renewal projects" (*The New York Times*, 2022). The crisis-driven frame was the second most common (28%), primarily in traditional media (34% of traditional texts vs. 22% of digital texts), focusing on traffic congestion and homelessness.

China: The national development frame (a country-specific emerging frame) was the most common (38%), dominant in both traditional media (45% of traditional texts) and digital media (31% of digital texts). Examples included: "Urbanization is key to China's goal of building a modern socialist country by 2035" (Xinhua News, 2021) and "The Greater Bay Area's urban integration will boost China's global economic competitiveness" (WeChat article, 2023). The solution-oriented frame was the second most common (27%), focusing on infrastructure projects (e.g., high-speed rail, smart cities) and environmental policies (e.g.,

carbon neutrality goals).

Brazil: The crisis-driven frame was the most prevalent (42%), with high representation in both traditional (40%) and digital (44%) media. This frame centered on slum proliferation, political corruption, and displacement: "Rio de Janeiro's slums now house 22% of the city's population, with no access to clean water" (TV Globo, 2023) and "Funds for São Paulo's subway project were stolen by politicians, delaying construction for 2 years" (*Mídia Ninja*, 2022). The political corruption frame (emerging frame) was the second most common (22%), unique to Brazil and absent in the U.S. and China.

4.1.2 Traditional vs. Digital Media Differences

Across all countries, digital media was more likely to use the social justice frame (24% of digital texts vs. 12% of traditional texts) and the political corruption frame (15% of digital texts vs. 5% of traditional texts), while traditional media was more likely to use the national development frame (28% of traditional texts vs. 16% of digital texts) and the economic opportunity frame (22% of traditional texts vs. 14% of digital texts).

Notable country-specific differences included:

United States: Digital media (Twitter, Facebook) was a platform for marginalized voices, with 65% of social justice frame texts in digital media authored by citizens or activists (vs. 35% in traditional media). Traditional media (*The New York Times*, CNN) was more balanced, with 50% of texts using multiple frames (e.g., combining social justice and solution-oriented frames).

China: Traditional media (CCTV News, *People's Daily*) was almost exclusively focused on the national development frame (45% of texts), while digital media (WeChat, Douyin) included more diverse frames: 31% national development, 27% solution-oriented, and 18% social justice (e.g., posts about housing displacement in Beijing).

Brazil: Digital media (*Mídia Ninja*, WhatsApp groups) was more critical of government policies: 60% of crisis-driven frame texts in digital media

criticized urban projects (vs. 40% in traditional media). Traditional media (*O Globo*, TV Globo) was split along partisan lines: pro-government outlets used the economic opportunity frame (30% of texts), while opposition outlets used the crisis-driven frame (35% of texts).

4.1.3 Misinformation in Digital Media (RQ4)

Misinformation was found exclusively in digital media (0% in traditional media) and varied significantly by country:

United States: 18% of digital media texts contained misinformation, primarily about housing and gentrification. Common claims included: “Immigrants are responsible for 80% of housing shortages in New York” (Twitter post, 2023) and “Green gentrification is a government plot to evict low-income families” (Facebook group, 2022). Most misinformation (70%) was spread by anonymous users or small activist groups.

China: 8% of digital media texts contained misinformation, focused on environmental and infrastructure projects. Examples included: “Shanghai’s new subway line will cause earthquakes” (Douyin video, 2023) and “China’s carbon neutrality goals will increase electricity prices by 50%” (WeChat post, 2022). Misinformation was quickly removed by platform moderators: 90% of false posts were taken down within 48 hours.

Brazil: 32% of digital media texts contained misinformation, the highest among the three countries. Most misinformation was related to urban renewal and public transportation: “São Paulo’s urban renewal project will destroy 10,000 homes ” (WhatsApp message, 2023) and “Rio de Janeiro’s new bus rapid transit (BRT) system will increase air pollution” (*Mídia Ninja* comment, 2022). Unlike China, misinformation in Brazil was rarely removed: only 15% of false posts were taken down within a week, due to limited platform moderation resources and weak government regulations (Ferreira, 2022).

4.2 Phase 2: Public Perception and Media Framing (RQ2)

4.2.1 Media Consumption Patterns

Table 2 summarizes media consumption across the three countries. Overall, digital media was the primary source of urbanization news for 68% of respondents, compared to 32% for traditional media. However, country differences were significant:

United States: 72% of respondents primarily used digital media (Twitter, Facebook) for urbanization news, with 45% reporting daily use of social media for this purpose. Traditional media was less common, with only 28% relying on newspapers or television, and most (60%) of these users were aged 55+.

China: Digital media (WeChat, Douyin) was dominant (65% primary source), but traditional media (CCTV News, *People’s Daily*) remained influential: 35% of respondents used it as their primary source, particularly among government employees (58%) and rural-urban migrants (42%).

Brazil: Digital media was the primary source for 67% of respondents, with WhatsApp being the most popular platform (52% used it daily for urbanization news). Traditional media had low trust: only 33% of respondents used it, and 70% reported distrusting TV Globo and *O Globo* due to perceived political bias (Almeida, 2021).

Trust in media sources also varied: in China, traditional media had the highest trust rating (mean=4.2/5), followed by digital state media (mean=3.8/5); in the U.S., traditional quality media (e.g., *The New York Times*) had the highest trust (mean=3.7/5), while social media had the lowest (mean=2.3/5); in Brazil, citizen journalism outlets (e.g., *Mídia Ninja*) had the highest trust (mean=3.5/5), while traditional media had the lowest (mean=1.9/5).

4.2.2 Trust in Government Urban Policies

Multiple regression analysis revealed a strong relationship between media framing and trust in government policies (Table 3). Key findings included:

Solution-oriented frame: Exposure to this frame was positively associated with trust in all

three countries ($\beta=0.32$, $p<0.001$ in the U.S.; $\beta=0.45$, $p<0.001$ in China; $\beta=0.28$, $p<0.001$ in Brazil). For example, Chinese respondents who frequently saw media coverage of infrastructure solutions (e.g., high-speed rail) had 45% higher trust in government urban policies than those with low exposure.

Crisis-driven frame: Exposure was negatively associated with trust, but the effect varied by country. The strongest negative effect was in Brazil ($\beta=-0.41$, $p<0.001$), followed by the U.S. ($\beta=-0.29$, $p<0.001$), and the weakest in China ($\beta=-0.18$, $p<0.01$). This suggests that crisis framing erodes trust more in countries with pre-existing low trust in government (e.g., Brazil) than in high-trust contexts (e.g., China).

Social justice frame: In the U.S., exposure to this frame was negatively associated with trust ($\beta=-0.25$, $p<0.001$), as media focus on unaddressed housing inequality reduced confidence in government action. In China, the effect was non-significant ($\beta=0.08$, $p=0.12$), likely because social justice frames in state media are paired with solution-oriented content. In Brazil, the effect was positive ($\beta=0.19$, $p<0.01$), as coverage of marginalized groups' struggles increased public support for government slum upgrading programs.

Demographic variables also played a role: higher education was positively associated with trust in the U.S. ($\beta=0.15$, $p<0.01$) and China ($\beta=0.12$, $p<0.05$) but negatively in Brazil ($\beta=-0.09$, $p<0.05$); income had a positive effect in China ($\beta=0.18$, $p<0.001$) but no effect in the U.S. or Brazil.

4.2.3 Support for Urban Projects

Support for urban projects (e.g., affordable housing, public transportation) was strongly influenced by media framing and media type (Table 4):

Economic opportunity frame: Exposure to this frame increased support for urban renewal and infrastructure projects in all three countries ($\beta=0.27$, $p<0.001$ in the U.S.; $\beta=0.38$, $p<0.001$ in China; $\beta=0.22$, $p<0.001$ in Brazil). For example, Brazilian respondents who saw media coverage of job creation from urban projects were 22% more likely to support them.

Digital vs. traditional media: In the U.S. and

Brazil, digital media exposure was associated with lower support for government-led projects ($\beta=-0.21$, $p<0.001$ in the U.S.; $\beta=-0.33$, $p<0.001$ in Brazil), due to higher criticism and misinformation in digital spaces. In China, digital media exposure had a positive effect ($\beta=0.25$, $p<0.001$), as digital state media aligned with traditional media's pro-policy messaging.

4.2.4 Misinformation Susceptibility

Misinformation susceptibility (measured by belief in false claims) varied by country and media consumption (Table 5):

Brazil: Had the highest susceptibility (mean=3.4/5), with 62% of respondents believing at least one false claim about urbanization. Susceptibility was highest among WhatsApp heavy users ($\beta=0.47$, $p<0.001$) and low-education respondents ($\beta=-0.31$, $p<0.001$).

United States: Susceptibility was moderate (mean=2.7/5), with 45% believing at least one false claim. It was highest among social media users ($\beta=0.35$, $p<0.001$) and respondents who distrusted traditional media ($\beta=0.28$, $p<0.001$).

China: Had the lowest susceptibility (mean=1.9/5), with 22% believing at least one false claim. Susceptibility was highest among users of unregulated digital platforms ($\beta=0.23$, $p<0.001$) but was mitigated by exposure to state media ($\beta=-0.36$, $p<0.001$), which provided corrective information.

4.3 Phase 3: Media Framing and Policy-Making (RQ3)

4.3.1 Frame Alignment Between Media and Policy

Table 6 presents the alignment between media frames and policy documents. Overall, alignment was highest in China (82%), followed by the U.S. (65%), and lowest in Brazil (48%):

China: 82% of policy documents reflected the national development frame (the dominant media frame), and 75% reflected the solution-oriented frame. For example, the "14th Five-Year Plan for Urbanization Development" (2021) explicitly linked urbanization to national economic goals, mirroring Xinhua's media

coverage. Only 15% of policies reflected the social justice frame, which was less common in media.

United States: 65% of policies aligned with media frames: 40% with the social justice frame (e.g., California’s “Affordable Housing Act” addressed housing inequality, as covered in *The New York Times*) and 25% with the solution-oriented frame (e.g., New York City’s “Green New Deal for Housing” reflected media coverage of environmental solutions). Alignment was lower for the crisis-driven frame (10%), as policies rarely addressed homelessness and traffic congestion as “crises.”

Brazil: 48% of policies aligned with media frames: 30% with the crisis-driven frame (e.g., Rio de Janeiro’s “Slum Sanitation Program” addressed slum conditions highlighted in TV Globo) and 18% with the social justice frame. Alignment was low for the political corruption frame (0%), as policies avoided addressing corruption, despite media coverage.

4.3.2 Policy Responsiveness to Media

Policy documents’ reference to media varied by country:

China: 65% of policy documents referenced media coverage, primarily state media, as a tool for policy dissemination. For example, Guangdong’s “Greater Bay Area Urban Renewal Policy” (2023) instructed local governments to use Xinhua and CCTV to “promote policy goals to the public.” Only 10% referenced digital media feedback, and these references focused on positive public comments.

United States: 55% of policies referenced media, with 35% citing public feedback from digital media. For example, California’s Senate Bill 9 (2023) explicitly noted that “public comments on Twitter and Facebook” influenced the bill’s final provisions on duplex construction. Traditional media was referenced in 20% of policies, primarily as evidence of public concern (e.g., *The New York Times* coverage of housing shortages).

Brazil: 30% of policies referenced media, with 20% citing citizen journalism and social media as a driver of policy changes. For example, São Paulo’s

“Slum Upgrading Program” (2022) acknowledged that “protests and media coverage by *Mídia Ninja*” led to increased funding for the program. However, 70% of policies did not reference media, due to political polarization and distrust between policymakers and media outlets (Ferreira, 2022).

4.3.3 Policy Response to Misinformation

How policies addressed misinformation varied dramatically:

China: 80% of policy documents included data and public education campaigns to refute misinformation. For example, Shanghai’s “Smart City Construction Plan” (2022) included a section with scientific data to debunk false claims about “smart city surveillance” and launched a WeChat campaign to share accurate information.

United States: 45% of policies addressed misinformation, primarily through transparency measures. For example, New York City’s “Housing Data Portal” (2024) was created to “provide accurate housing supply data to counter false claims about immigration and housing shortages.” However, 55% of policies did not address misinformation, due to limited funding and political gridlock.

Brazil: Only 15% of policies addressed misinformation, with most (10%) focusing on public statements rather than concrete actions. For example, Rio de Janeiro’s “BRT System Expansion Plan” (2023) included a press release refuting false claims about air pollution but did not launch a public education campaign. The low response was attributed to limited government capacity and high political turnover (Almeida, 2021).

5. Discussion

5.1 Key Findings and Alignment with Literature

This study’s findings advance our understanding of media-urbanization-policy dynamics across three diverse countries. First, we confirmed that media framing varies by media system: the state-dominated

media system in China prioritized the national development frame, the liberal system in the U.S. emphasized the social justice frame, and the polarized pluralist system in Brazil focused on the crisis-driven and political corruption frames. This aligns with Hallin and Mancini's (2004) media system theory, while extending it to non-Western contexts (e.g., China's national development frame) and digital media dynamics.

Second, we found that digital media amplifies marginalized voices (e.g., social justice frames in the U.S., anti-corruption frames in Brazil) but also spreads misinformation, particularly in countries with weak moderation (e.g., Brazil). This supports Newman et al.'s (2023) research on digital media's dual role in public discourse but adds a cross-national dimension: misinformation is more prevalent in countries with low media trust and limited regulation (Brazil) than in high-trust, regulated contexts (China).

Third, the relationship between media framing and public trust in policies is moderated by country context. The solution-oriented frame increased trust across all countries, but the crisis-driven frame had a stronger negative effect in low-trust countries (Brazil) than in high-trust countries (China). This extends Couldry's (2022) work on media and trust by showing that context—rather than framing alone—shapes public perception.

Fourth, policy responsiveness to media varies by political system: China's top-down system showed high frame alignment but low responsiveness to public feedback; the U.S.'s pluralist system showed moderate alignment and high responsiveness to digital feedback; Brazil's fragmented system showed low alignment and limited responsiveness. This aligns with Kingdon's (2020) policy agenda-setting theory, which emphasizes the role of political context in policy-making.

5.2 Theoretical Contributions

This study makes three theoretical contributions to global communication and media studies. First, we developed a **cross-national media-urbanization framework** that integrates media system theory,

framing theory, and policy agenda-setting theory. This framework accounts for political, economic, and cultural contexts, allowing scholars to compare media's role in urbanization across diverse countries—an improvement over single-country or Western-centric frameworks.

Second, we expanded framing theory to include country-specific emerging frames (e.g., national development in China, political corruption in Brazil). These frames are not captured in existing framing typologies but are critical to understanding media's role in non-Western contexts. For example, the national development frame in China reflects the state's use of media to legitimize urbanization as a political priority, a dynamic that is absent in liberal media systems.

Third, we identified a digital media moderation-misinformation nexus: countries with strong digital media moderation (China) had lower misinformation and higher public trust, while countries with weak moderation (Brazil) had higher misinformation and lower trust. This nexus provides a new lens for studying digital media's impact on policy-making, highlighting the need to consider regulation and moderation in addition to content.

5.3 Practical Implications

The findings have practical implications for policymakers, media practitioners, and civil society:

Policymakers: In low-trust countries (Brazil), policymakers should prioritize solution-oriented messaging to build trust, rather than focusing on crises. In high-trust countries (China), they should incorporate more public feedback from digital media to address marginalized groups' concerns. In the U.S., policymakers should invest in accurate data portals to counter misinformation.

Media practitioners: Traditional media should balance crisis coverage with solution-oriented content to avoid eroding trust (e.g., Brazil's TV Globo could pair slum crisis coverage with stories about successful upgrading programs). Digital platforms should strengthen moderation in countries with high misinformation (e.g., WhatsApp in Brazil could partner

with fact-checking organizations).

Civil society: In the U.S., activists can use digital media to amplify social justice frames and pressure policymakers (e.g., TikTok campaigns for affordable housing). In Brazil, citizen journalism outlets should partner with policymakers to translate anti-corruption frames into policy action. In China, civil society can use digital platforms to provide constructive feedback on urban projects (e.g., WeChat suggestions for smart city improvements).

5.4 Limitations

This study has several limitations. First, our sample of media texts focused on national outlets, which may not capture local media dynamics (e.g., local newspapers in small U.S. cities, community blogs in Brazil). Future research should include local media to understand how framing varies by geographic scale.

Second, our survey was cross-sectional, so we cannot establish causal relationships between media framing and public perception (e.g., we cannot confirm that exposure to the solution-oriented frame *causes* higher trust, only that they are correlated). Longitudinal studies are needed to test causality.

Third, our policy document review focused on publicly available documents, which may not include internal government communications (e.g., meeting minutes, draft policies) that could reveal more about media's influence. Future research could use interviews with policymakers to supplement document analysis.

Fourth, we did not analyze the role of algorithms in digital media framing (e.g., how TikTok's algorithm promotes crisis-driven frames in Brazil). Algorithm analysis would provide a more complete understanding of digital media dynamics.

5.5 Future Research Directions

Based on these limitations, we propose four future research directions:

Local media and urbanization: Explore how local media frames urbanization challenges (e.g., small-town vs. big-city framing in the U.S.) and how this influences local policy-making.

Longitudinal studies: Track media framing, public perception, and policy changes over time (e.g., 5–10 years) to establish causal relationships.

Algorithm analysis: Investigate how social media algorithms (e.g., TikTok, WeChat) prioritize urbanization frames and misinformation, and how this varies by country.

Media and urbanization in Global South countries: Expand the cross-national focus to include more Global South countries (e.g., India, Nigeria) to develop a truly global framework.

6. Conclusion

This study examined the role of traditional and digital media in shaping public perception and policy-making during urbanization in the United States, China, and Brazil. Using a mixed-methods approach, we found that media framing varies by media system, digital media has a dual role (amplifying voices vs. spreading misinformation), country context moderates the relationship between framing and trust, and policy responsiveness to media depends on political system and capacity.

These findings highlight that there

is no “one-size-fits-all” model for media's role in urbanization. Instead, media's impact is deeply embedded in a country's political system, media infrastructure, and public trust dynamics. For global communication scholars, this means moving beyond Western-centric frameworks to embrace context-specific analyses of media-urbanization interactions. For practitioners, it means tailoring media strategies and policy responses to the unique needs of each country—whether that involves strengthening digital moderation in Brazil, integrating public feedback in China, or countering misinformation with data in the U.S.

Ultimately, this study underscores the critical role of media in navigating the challenges of global urbanization. As cities continue to grow and digital media becomes increasingly central to public discourse, understanding how media shapes perception and

policy will be essential to building more equitable, sustainable, and inclusive urban societies.

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Appendix A: Survey Instrument (Excerpt)

Section 1: Media Consumption

How often do you use the following sources to get news about urbanization (e.g., housing, traffic, pollution)?

◦Never (1) | Rarely (2) | Occasionally (3) | Frequently (4) | Daily (5)

- a. National newspapers (e.g., *The New York Times*, *People's Daily*, *Folha de São Paulo*)
- b. National television news (e.g., CNN, CCTV News, TV Globo)
- c. Social media (e.g., Twitter/X, WeChat, WhatsApp)
- d. Citizen journalism outlets (e.g., *BuzzFeed News*, *Caixin*, *Mídia Ninja*)

Which of the following sources do you trust most for news about urbanization?

- National newspapers
- National television news
- Social media
- Citizen journalism outlets
- Other (please specify: _____)

Section 2: Public Perception of Urbanization

To what extent do you trust your government to address the following urban challenges?

- Strongly disagree (1) | Disagree (2) | Neutral (3) | Agree (4) | Strongly agree (5)
- a. Housing shortages
- b. Traffic congestion
- c. Environmental pollution
- d. Displacement due to urban renewal

To what extent do you support the following urban projects in your city?

- Strongly disagree (1) | Disagree (2) | Neutral (3) | Agree (4) | Strongly agree (5)

- a. Building more affordable housing
- b. Expanding public transportation (e.g., subways, buses)
- c. Urban renewal of slums or low-income neighborhoods
- d. Building more green spaces (e.g., parks, community gardens)

Section 3: Misinformation Susceptibility

How true do you think the following statements are?

- Definitely false (1) | Probably false (2) | Neutral (3) | Probably true (4) | Definitely true (5)
- a. Immigrants are responsible for most housing shortages in my city.
- b. Green buildings (e.g., energy-efficient apartments) cause higher rates of asthma.
- c. Funds for urban renewal projects are often stolen by government officials.
- d. Expanding public transportation will increase air pollution in my city.

Section 4: Demographics

Age: _____

Gender: Male | Female | Non-binary | Prefer not to say

Highest level of education: High school or less | College | Graduate degree | Prefer not to say

Household income (annual): _____ (local currency)

City of residence: _____