



Japan Bilingual Publishing Co.

Philosophy and Realistic Reflection

<https://ojs.bilpub.com/index.php/prr>

ARTICLE

Philosophy's Independence in Modernity: The Temporality of Myth and "Equality of Intelligences" as Conditions for Cultivating the Philosophical Environment

Nikita Konstantinovich Nekliudov^{1*} , Siyana Vitalievna Shchepanovskaya^{2*} 

¹ Independent Researcher, Saint Petersburg 194295, Russia

² Independent Researcher, Saint Petersburg 195256, Russia

ABSTRACT

Contemporary mass interest in self-improvement and mindfulness requires philosophy to solve the problems of a modern soul no worse than other initiatives in the field of mind ecology. However, professional philosophers lose the philosophy and reduce it, for example, to teaching critical thinking. It often turns into a market product and falls victim to oversimplification. This stems from the fact that contemporary philosophical practice often actualizes only the "logical" tendencies of philosophy, thereby merely sustaining the broader cultural orientation toward rationality, the other side of which, as we know, is the crisis of the symbolic. However, the philosophers tend to avoid including a mythopoetic philosophical tradition in their practice, as myth and symbol remain fundamentally unmanageable within modern culture, evoking deep-seated disquiet. Evidently, it is the rare unity of these two vectors that creates the mystery and hypnotism of philosophy and its great names. Thus, the main idea of the article is that the modern way of philosophy can be shaped by myth-symbolic temporality, which is excluded from contemporary philosophy at the institutional and communicative dimensions. This time-as-intensity (especially in its renewal qualities) has to be integrated into the philosophical event (which finds its sharpness in the linear time of history) in a non-reductive manner. This is no longer a purely theoretical perspective in which mythopoiesis is internalized or monologized, but the

*CORRESPONDING AUTHOR:

Nikita Konstantinovich Nekliudov, Independent Researcher, Saint Petersburg 194295, Russia; Email: sgorvokean@gmail.com; Siyana Vitalievna Shchepanovskaya, Independent Researcher, Saint Petersburg 195256, Russia; Email: siyaniesil@gmail.com

ARTICLE INFO

Received: 16 November 2025 | Revised: 25 December 2025 | Accepted: 15 January 2026 | Published Online: 10 February 2026

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.55121/prr.v3i1.959>

CITATION

Nekliudov, N.K., Shchepanovskaya, S.V., 2026. Philosophy's Independence in Modernity: The Temporality of Myth and "Equality of Intelligences" as Conditions for Cultivating the Philosophical Environment. *Philosophy and Realistic Reflection*. 3(1): 170–187. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.55121/prr.v3i1.959>

COPYRIGHT

Copyright © 2026 by the author(s). Published by Japan Bilingual Publishing Co. This is an open access article under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>).

prospect of a new type of philosophical practice and communities, which we propose to understand as an environment of already-non-reflective openness to myth and symbol.

Keywords: Philosophical Practice; Philosophical Communities; Symbolic Crisis; Symbolic Forms; Mythopoiesis in Philosophy; Philosophy for Children; Intellectual Emancipation; Mindfulness

1. The “Koan” of Modern Philosophy: Is There an Environment beyond the Philosopher?

For philosophy to be a response to the crises of modernity, it has to stop being the “philosophers”. Philosophy must become philosophy! It sounds even too philosophical, but such a paradox could well be used in a manner of Japanese koan in some contemporary school of philosophy to lead the student to the question of the way of being of philosophy in the modern world. Not the classical question “what is philosophy?”, but rather the matter of the way of presence among the diverse environments of human life. This way of questioning shifts our thought into the philosophical anthropology^[1], which is characterized by an interest in diverse anthropological practices and ways for the formation of symbolic identity, or even in the direction of the sociology of philosophy^[2].

The influence of contemporary trends is pushing philosophy to move from Heraclitean solitude toward a mass practice of mindfulness. Thus, since the second half of the 20th century, the direction of “philosophical practice” has been developing^[3], and since the last decade of the 20th century, “teaching philosophy to children” has been evolving^[4]. However, to take this step to a new social form without degenerating into sophistry or a “ready-made program” dogmatism, philosophy has to hermeneutically empathize with its own environment. To provoke our imagination, we say “with the aether of its own archetype.” If the philosophers explicate the way of being of the philosophical environment in a non-reductive manner, and create a discursive environment of its unconscious, then they will acquire the art of cultivating and conducting. And, accordingly, a chance to invite the wanderers into this garden. Much like Epicurus invited them to his own.

As long as a philosopher in the world is like a rare natural phenomenon, he is forced to bear the burden of

an entire philosophical environment. Each philosopher is forced to create himself as a transpersonal cultural phenomenon. In this, he is most similar to a musician or poet, since they not only realize their “poiesis” but also create a way for the listener to perceive his artistic act. “*In fact, every language conveys its own teaching and carries its meaning into the listener’s mind (...) by its own action, creates its own public, if it really says something; that is, it does so by secreting its own meaning*”^[5]. The only difference is that a beholder in a musical or poetical event, as a rule, tends and already knows how to assist the artist in this (at least by their openness), while mass perception of philosophy is more wary due to the lack of any intuitively graspable criteria for the philosophical nature of some philosophical event. Is this philosophy happening or not?

Evidently, philosophers have already interpreted philosophy as an event (Heidegger, Deleuze, Badiou, etc.), but the aesthetic environment is still currently more understandable and hospitable than the philosophical one. The reason, perhaps, lies on the surface: aesthetic education occupies a significant place in school education, during which a person “absorbs” the keys to the infinitely expanding aether of aesthetics. In an intuitive movement towards happiness, towards resourceful states, toward a new milestone on the spiritual path, etc., it is much easier for us to hermeneutically attune ourselves and step into the aesthetic environment. Philosophy, as one of the human environments of life, has not yet achieved “entelechy” of its own, or discursive fullness, neither for a wide range of people nor even for the thinkers themselves. Philosophers find themselves in the world either as lonely, sad troubadours and bizarre traveling performers, or they are chained to educational institutions, seeking to belong to the “cultured” scientific-philosophical environment. While one is too preoccupied with survival, the others rely too much on the “customary”; therefore, neither are skilled enough in cultivating the periphery of philosophizing, or, using slightly different terms, the unconscious of the philosophical envi-

ronment. Therefore, thinkers are unable to sustain philosophy in the cultural space of modernity as something living, as a kind of element, as a real, rather than a potential and virtual cultural environment.

This article is an attempt to identify the phenomena that constitute the philosophical environment as a symbolic form (Cassirer) ^[6], or as intensity-temporality (Deleuze–Guattari) ^[7], or as a dispositio of Agamben ^[8], or as a community of intellectuals (Collins) ^[2], etc., involvement in it induces specific processes in a person that do not occur in other life environments: such as production, art, education, medicine, religion, etc.

2. Grasping the Whole: Philosophy between Consumer Form and Archetype

Modernity demands philosophy more and more insistently: along with crises, the “global world” has generated a mass interest in a mindful lifestyle, self-improvement, and the ecology of mind. We could hear in this demand the voice of a “consumer society” hungry for exoticism, but it is more philosophically to think about it as a collective dream of a universal world’s language, which, by and large, is philosophy (as the language of consciousness) with its more self-confident derivatives, like psychology.

But do our dreams have prospects? Can we confidently say that we grasp philosophy as a whole? For when it comes to philosophy proper, we “*find ourselves faced with divergent and often fundamentally mutually delegitimizing intellectual scenarios, which at the same time assure that they have no points of contact whatsoever. Evidently, the most natural move in this situation of conflict between heterogeneous philosophical orientations is to settle on one of them and use it as an organon*” ^[1]. This tendency may be illustrated by various projects like “Daily Stoic” ^[9], which resourcefully adapted the philosophy of Stoicism to the modern self-help format, has become popular. The project’s success is caused by its complete intellectual-aesthetic form, inherited from the ancient Stoics.

Expanding on this point, it can be argued that such timeless efficacy of philosophy is precisely due to the brilliant apprehension (or perhaps even the feeling) of form by its individual visionaries. Forms in the sense that “*complet-*

ed harmonies act by their completeness” ^[10]. Philosophers who have become symbols “*...contain within themselves the potential for the unsealing of our beliefs*” ^[10]: through the singular form that they have imprinted upon the cultural symbolic landscape, our thinking, as if guided by a magical narrative, falls through them into non-ordinary states.

At the same time, philosophy as a whole phenomenon is not as crystallized as an individual philosopher. But if we are not trying to maintain the image of an opinion fair by creating a product with “consumer value,” but instead strive to clearly reveal the best in the philosopher-archetype, then we have to strive to grasp and hold philosophy as a unified whole. But philosophy has habits: it is constantly engaged in problematizing itself and constantly recreates itself anew, and furthermore, philosophy, following Socrates and Nicholas of Cusa, allows itself to be in “ignorantia”. All this sells poorly. Since ancient times, it has been said that “*all the sciences, indeed, are more necessary*” ^[11] than philosophy. Continuing the above, we can add that nowadays “philosophers are more necessary than philosophy.” This leads us to the central paradox of philosophy’s current condition. On the one hand, it is in demand as an archetype and a language of consciousness; on the other—its institutional, professional form finds itself in a profound crisis. As aptly noted in a contemporary study, “*...we have reached a paradoxical situation in which the professionalization of philosophy has, in essence, undone the very profession...*” ^[12]. Professionalization, having severed philosophy from its mythopoetic roots and living dialogue, has transformed it into a self-reproducing system whose value society fails to grasp.

3. Toward an “Outside” View: The Dispersed Image of Philosophy in Late Modernity (Russia, USA, France)

Philosophy contains a multitude of phenomena, which is why it is not easy to talk about philosophy. “Hey, let’s go to philosophy today!”—what can we, situated within the horizon of our given everydayness, put into this short phrase? What wholeness, what perspective flickers behind this sentence? What symbol induces our “poetic imagination” ^[13] (in terms of Gaston Bachelard)? If, for

example, we continue the idea of the unformedness of philosophy, then in this tendency, it is an expression of inner freedom and creative indeterminacy, which are the permanent sources of human vitality. Do we expect to meet an Old Easy Fisherman Zhuang Zhou^[14] when we are going to an open philosophy lecture at the end of the week? Do we engage in the continuum of this feeling? Or do we saddle some other symbolic intensity? What does our anticipation of a philosophical event consist of? And the aftertaste? A field for hermeneutic work opens up here. *“And as, in a foreign country, I begin to understand the meaning of words through their place in a context of action, and by taking part in a communal life—in the same way as as yet imperfectly understood piece of philosophical writing discloses to me at least a certain ‘style’—either a Spinozist, critical or phenomenological one—which is the first draft of its meaning. I begin to understand a philosophy by feeling my way into its existential manner, by reproducing the tone and accent of the philosopher”*^[15]. But what happens if we apply this hermeneutic empathy to the whole of philosophy?

Let us consider a few more examples from the life of philosophy in different socio-cultural spaces of modernity, so that a greater variability of “outside” views on philosophy appears before us.

If we take the Russian-speaking reality as an example, philosophy here is usually perceived through the spectacles of the “Spirit of gravity” (Nietzsche^[15]) or in the aesthetics of Dostoevsky, and at open lectures, the audience is divided in half: into the students and the random weirdos who frighten the students. The atmosphere contradicts any real affect from a philosophical work: the real minimum gained from reading a philosophical text is the joy of a starved mind, but the philosophy enthusiast here seeks too hard for the “horror of being,” “fear and trembling,” etc. This attitude did not arise out of nowhere—it is historically conditioned by the brutal oppression of dissident intellectuals in the Soviet era. Not only in relation to the public philosophical scene but also in relation to the aforementioned philosophical practice and teaching philosophy to children, the Russian-speaking space is, for now, in the rearguard of the global process. We possess a deep historico-philosophical tradition, which, unfortunately, remains largely confined to academia and private dialogue

with books. So, the mass perception of philosophy bears the traces of 70 years of ideological pressure: free, as if “unnecessary” philosophical ignorance has merged with the pervasive, oppressive feeling of unfreedom permeating everyday life. The general cultural atmosphere of the bygone era can be illustrated by a quote from the song “Electric Dog” (1981) by the cult Russian world-music band Aquarium:

“We grew up in a field of such tension,
where any device burns out instantly”^[16].

And this is not the only pathology of public consciousness. In the Russian-speaking world, the question of creating a middle philosophical environment and a culture of thinking in general is particularly acute and is inextricably linked with the deep healing of profound “cultural traumas” (Eyerman^[17]). Another such trauma is the constant breakdown of the cultural continuity mechanisms. Perhaps philosophy is perceived grimly because it is fused with this trauma as well, and therefore, its whole is not perceived as an environment where one could inhabit. On the contrary, the unsettling rebellious features of philosophical action are revealed here, presenting it mainly as a technique of crisis.

When analyzing the sociology of philosophy, it is noteworthy that in the United States, where Matthew Lipman pioneered modern philosophy for children in the 1970s, there remains a perceived need to present this approach with a deliberate and didactic tone. Let us take as an example Martha Nussbaum’s book “Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities”. In it, the famous philosopher, moving along the reformist lines of John Dewey and Rabindranath Tagore, reflects on the importance of Socratic dialogue in educating a truly democratic citizen of the world and states that the global economic race is the cause of the global erosion of education. It is surprising that even in India (a country of living myth and the birthplace of enlightenment), the educational system is increasingly choosing what is useful for the economy for immediate utility. Nussbaum observes a ubiquitous decline in humanities education, calling this situation a “silent crisis.” *“We are pursuing the possessions that protect, please, and comfort us—what Tagore called our material “covering.” But we seem to be forgetting about the soul, about what it is for thought to open out of the soul and connect person*

to world in a rich, subtle, and complicated manner; about what it is to approach another person as a soul, rather than as a mere useful instrument or an obstacle to one's own plans; about what it is to talk as someone who has a soul to someone else whom one sees as similarly deep and complex"^[18].

The modern philosophical environment in France does not look cloudless either. Since philosophy in the 20th century resonated from here throughout the world, the laws of academic elitism and liberal-capitalist forces of consumer society operate here with equal force. According to Michel Onfray, both university and public philosophy constantly fall into the traps of their "all too human." The university, in Onfray's expression, turns into a ghetto, while the public intellectual is drawn either into the hype of pop culture or into ideological populism. In a short article, "The Miseries and Grandeur of Philosophy", the philosopher gives a critical sketch of the contemporary philosophical landscape of France and confronts the current philosophical practices with the structure of The People's University (Université Populaire), founded by him in 2002 in Caen as a new way of being of philosophy. "*The Popular University (...) intends to be a 'collective intellectual,' to use Pierre Bourdieu's formulation. In other words, it is about a gathered team of individuals possessing their own unique qualities but at the same time concerned with confronting their theses, theories, works, and lectures with the group. This philosophical community strives not for ideological univocity but for coherence: for an existential, joyful, and political practice of philosophy, a leftist engagement that assumes that we do not accumulate knowledge for personal purposes but share it, give it, and distribute it among those who are usually deprived of it. (...) The collective intellectual, which is the philosophical community of the Popular University, offers, in contrast to Plato's Republic (closed, locked, totalitarian, hierarchical, and racial), the Garden of Epicurus (open, free, egalitarian, friendly, cosmopolitan) beyond the walls. No longer limited by an architectural sedentary space, but nomadic, radiating from its center"*^[19]. According to Onfray, the cultivation of such an anarchic environment (under the motto "Elitism for all") generates the effect of molecular micro-revolutions: a certain level of consciousness is transmitted almost capillarly (biological metaphors belong to Guattari) through

the aether of the centers of philosophical culture.

We see here approximate "outside" views on philosophy. These approximations interest us as guidance from the "what is asked about," to speak in a phenomenological manner. In these nebulae, here and there, a certain unformed image of philosophy manifests. Whether this is done accidentally, or as a philosophical act of resistance to language (to avoid clichés), contemporary reasoning about philosophy, one way or another, implies a certain environment in which certain ideas and states circulate, where something is possible that is impossible in other spaces. If not an environment, then at least an instrument that ensures this circulation. The latter can even be understood as a common feature of modern philosophy: Rancière with his "disagreement"^[20], Latour with "actor-network-theory"^[21], Agamben with "deactivation"^[22]. Authoritative contemporary philosophers covertly attempt to give the reader a technique of the self, which would destroy all sorts of monsters of the sleeping mind, initiating a renewal of mind. Unfortunately, their techniques are too connected with their own enemies. Too "stitched in", for example, to politics. This connection reminds the unconscious alliance of medicine with diseases. Its unconsciousness is expressed in the fact that "salutogenesis" (as a pair to pathogenesis) was invented only in the twentieth century, and after the Second World War.

4. Salutogenesis and Philosophy

Salutogenesis (lat. salus—"health"), developed by medical sociologist Aaron Antonovsky, is an approach that focuses not on the causes of disease (pathogenesis) but on the "origins of health", asking what helps people stay healthy despite stress and adversity. Its core concept is the "Sense of Coherence (SOC)"—a global orientation that life is "comprehensible" (structured, predictable, and explicable), "manageable" (resources are available to meet demands), and "meaningful" (demands are challenges worthy of engagement). A strong SOC allows individuals to mobilize internal and external "Generalized Resistance Resources (GRR)", successfully cope with stressors, and move toward the healthy end of the "health ease/dis-ease continuum"^[23].

We use the term salutogenesis to signify a shift in

philosophy's purpose: from diagnosing errors and treating the "diseases" of thought—toward actively cultivating its "health," resilience, and meaningful coherence. This allows us to view the philosophical environment not as a clinic, but as a viable ecosystem.

5. Why a "Manifesto of Philosophy" Cannot Cultivate an Independence: The Dead End of Exclusive Models

To look at speech coming not "from the outside", but at examples of how philosophy itself represents itself to the public space, let us turn to Alain Badiou's "Manifesto for Philosophy." But not as a philosophical text, but treating it precisely as a manifesto. It exists to clarify for one and all the ontic difference of philosophy from other entities. What is important for us here is that Badiou tries to point to philosophy through what philosophy is not. Openly criticizing all sorts of declarations about the end of philosophy, Badiou takes a more constructive position and attempts to create a "contemporary configuration" for philosophy by highlighting its transversal generic conditions.

Badiou asserts that philosophy is a rare, in terms of intensity, "event" of "compossibility" of four "generic procedures": "matheme" (not mathematics) poetry, political invention, and love. Philosophy gives these four ways of truth a refuge and "provides a mode of access to the unity of the moment of truths" ^[24]. "The specific aim of philosophy is to propose a unified conceptual space in which the naming of events that serve as the starting point for truth procedures takes its place (...) It does not establish any truth, but provides a place for truths" ^[24]. In this space, "the freedom of circulation, the self-movement of thought in the articulated element of the state of its conditions" ^[24] is realized, and in this environment, thought gains access to now.

We could use this Manifesto as a methodological guide in some modern philosophical school, but only as one of the guides, because such an approach painfully emphasizes the rarity of the philosophical event. It would be codified according to the logic of the manifesto as an imitation of philosophy, and from such a foundation, we naturally could not grow anything inspiring. We would not even philosophize with children. At the very least, we

would have to give it another name, but such a thing is unlikely to happen because the magic word "philosophy" is a symbol that refers modern humans to their archetype, and it induces something that is not born in our mind without it. This is not a criticism of the Manifesto. However, it cannot help us to cultivate an environment, or a real living space, in which philosophy would be sustained as if by itself. Badiou's idea exists in the logic of history and is therefore subject to negative tendencies as well, for example, the idea of progress, or the painful individualism of Western European thinking (in this generalized assessment, we rely on a holistic critique of Eurocentrism, presented, for example, in the work of D. Goody "The Theft of History" ^[25]). Strictly speaking, the Manifesto obliges anyone who wants to be close to philosophy to be at the very cutting edge of history and places the entire burden of the philosophical environment on a single person again. Therefore, although philosophy is burdened by history, the cultivation of a philosophical environment must take into account not only the linear time of history but also the "eternal return" of myth, and in general different heterogeneous temporalities, which Deleuze and Guattari, for example, write about in "A Thousand Plateaus."

The search for a philosophical environment as an intensity that sets temporality also implies singular I-intensities: a young philosopher who has received a higher education is filled with inspiration to bring the good of the elevation of the mind, that is, complex speech and text saturated with "worlds of thought," felt and lived, he thirsts to offer for contemplation the beauty and skill of a flexible conceptual thinking and unusual, non-standard logic. But they immediately find themselves in a class that is essentially marginal, even if they did not want to be such. This intensity exists according to its own internal laws but requires guidance. We encounter many guides, success stories, and interviews designed to somehow orient the archaically intense young philosopher in the modern rational world, but they tell us how to overcome impostor syndrome and adapt a young philosopher to the current configuration of "immovable and hostile boundaries established between people by need, arbitrariness, and insolent fashion" ^[26]. But the young philosopher is guided by the force of "poetic imagination" and demands philosophy, and nothing else. Philosophy here, with even greater force,

manifests as an archetype, since “*it always brings with it a certain special ‘influence’ or force, thanks to which its impact has a numinous, i.e., enchanting or prompting to action, effect*”^[27].

The philosophical writings of beginners often assert obvious things with emotional force and seem boring to read. However, the young philosopher, just like the established one, is at the cutting edge of their time. But so far only “in a state.” Indeed, this poetic inspiration, and perhaps “the wonder” of which Aristotle spoke, occupies almost the greater part of a philosopher’s life compared to the moments of their *akmē*, when they tune not to the semi-known but begin to express the unknown and institute a truly resonant concept. But this is a generative passivity. For its analysis, we can turn, for example, to Merleau-Ponty’s “Phenomenology of Perception”^[5], where the creative character of this “passivity” is expressed in the light of the idea of becoming. We propose using the construct “generative passivity” to describe the unconscious of the philosophical environment. This useful term has been established as a central concept in the recent work by scholar Don Beith, “The Birth of Sense: Generative Passivity in Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy”^[28]. Should a contemporary “practicing philosopher” adopt the use of this term, it would significantly aid them in maintaining a confident position within the modern public sphere. Since we have concerned ourselves with thematizing the philosophical environment, the figure of the young philosopher was needed here to add color to our still impressionistically hazy landscape of the whole of philosophy. This image of a beginning thinker is endowed with both positive dynamism and simultaneous tragedy: just as the resentment of the “all too human” is sad, so acts the “all too philosophical.” Merleau-Ponty, in his address “In Praise of Philosophy”, says the following. “*To find the true function of philosophy, one must remember that philosophers, such as we ourselves are and whose books we read, have never ceased to see as their master the man who does not write, does not teach, at least in state institutions, who addresses those he meets on the street, and experiences difficulties when confronting common opinions and authorities*”^[29]. Thus, the young philosopher is tragic because he is about to lose access to carefree inspiration by already existing treasures: they will have to become, for example, a martyr-Socrates, or a dissi-

dent, or become a philosophical consultant and, learn “cruelty” with Oscar Brenifier^[30], or consult for business, etc. Is there anything in the positive dynamism of the young philosopher besides youthful maximalism?

So, if a person with a specialized education cannot withstand the demands of the Manifesto, then what can be said about the rest of humanity, most of whom are deprived of this beautiful fate? Is humanity allowed to actively philosophize, that is, to love wisdom? Or should the masses always occupy a passive (this time not generative) position in relation to the great philosophers? This is not a rhetorical question but a quite pressing organizational question. We (philosophers) have many historical forms of philosophy, but we still cannot organize philosophy in such a way that it remains itself.

6. Beyond the Exclusive Event: The “Ignorant Schoolmaster” and the Generosity of Philosophy

We (anyone could be in our place) turned to the Manifesto because this literary form claims to be a public emblem; however, while giving a sophisticated articulation of the intellectual space of philosophy, this text nevertheless manifests in public space the familiar mythologeme of the exclusivity of philosophy. Bearing in mind the performative tendencies in contemporary philosophy, it would be correct to follow the futurists or dadaists and write another dozen manifestos, but, evidently, if you look closely, almost every philosopher writes something like a manifesto when, for example, they redefine philosophy itself. An interesting philosophical gesture in this sense (and directly opposite to the rarity of philosophy sounding in the Manifesto) is one of Jacques Rancière’s early works, “The Ignorant Schoolmaster”, devoted to the 19th-century teacher Joseph Jacotot and his anarchic educational practice of “universal teaching.” Often, Rancière’s philosophical-political ideas about “disagreement” are considered as his definition of philosophy, but this work expresses much more vividly the deep foundations of the philosopher’s way of being. Rancière shows how, through the Jacotot’s practice of “intellectual emancipation,” the idea of freedom truly breaks into reality. The idea, as that which carries with it its mytho-poetic experience. By “truly” we mean—

in the maximum possible intensity of its aesthetic experience. So, in the philosopher's eyes, "panecastic" (French: panécastique "everything in each" from Greek πᾶν and ἕκαστον) teaching reveals itself not so much as a variant of humanistic education but as the undermining of all sorts of power discourses and methodological constraints, and as an absolute, even impossible, explosion. Its ultimate lies in the fact that by allowing people to teach each other what they themselves do not understand, we seem to plunge our rationally structured society into intellectual relativity, into chaos, into anarchy in its negative image. By taking away the authority of the teacher to explain the textbook, we not only take away the power of social segregation (which, by the way, in our "democratic" times, according to Baudrillard, is precisely being intensively realized through education^[31]), we, first of all, stir up the deep-seated concern of the rationally oriented Western European consciousness about the irrational. This refers to the fundamental distrust of humans, developed from the interpretation of them as at the origin irrational/animal/instinctive. Moving along the coordinates of Nietzsche, we can see its origin in "Socratism"^[26]. "Emancipation" of the mind, as Jacotot called it, frightened the contemporaries of the ignorant schoolmaster and frightens us: so, for example, we see that anarchism remains a marginal topic exclusively due to random reasons gravitate to the fundamental distrust.

Rancière ends the book by noting that Jacotot's practice in its authentic form did not take root. However, in light of the search for a methodology for cultivating a philosophical environment, the congeniality of Jacotot's ideas to philosophy itself is striking. Could philosophy, which always addresses the world, adopt the practice of intellectual emancipation? Drawing on its motifs, Rancière outlines his utopia of a community of equals. "So, one can dream of a society of the emancipated, which would be a society of artists. Such a society would renounce the division between those who know and those who do not know, (...) It would know only minds in action: people who do, who talk about what they do, and thereby turn the fruits of their work into a means of demonstrating the humanity inherent in them, as in all of us"^[32]. We, in turn, will also dream. Let us imagine a society or a State (in a Platonic manner), in which philosophers by vocation and profession do not become kings, as in Plato, but instead established

philosophical communities where ignorant people teach philosophy to each other. A specific professional philosopher (or team) in this simple structure is an optional (!) supervisor—a senior mentor, to whom they periodically turn with various questions. And the most important thing in our utopia is that these specific dilettantes are also engaged in philosophy. Like Plato, Lao Tzu, Buddha, Descartes, Nietzsche, Foucault, Badiou, Rancière... The very same philosophy. The philosophy indeed. Radicalism in the interpretation of the figure of the genius in panecastic learning should definitely be listed in the manifesto of such a philosophical environment. Jacotot's idea is that thanks to an outstanding creator, "we know that we are the same kind of human being as he is. And equally thanks to him we learn the power of language, which conveys this to us through the arbitrariness of signs. (...) It remains for us to verify this equality, to conquer this power through our own work. The lesson of emancipation from the artist, point by point opposing the lesson of stultification from the professor; is as follows: each of us is an artist to the extent that they undertake a double movement; they are not content with their position as a specialist but want to turn any work into a means of expression; they are not content with experiencing something but strive to share it"^[32]. Philosophers truly need to allow people to engage in philosophy. Just as musicians allow people to engage in music. But do philosophers possess sufficient generosity for such a gesture?

7. The "Already-Non-Reflective" as a Key to a Generative Philosophical Atmosphere

The most vivid historical example, naturally, is the expansion of philosophy in the Hellenistic era, when it transformed from a speculative discipline into a widespread life practice, a kind of "technique of the self." Comparison with the era of Hellenism is often used in modern studies of philosophical practice^[33,34]. This example serves as a prototype for our project—the creation of a new, autonomous philosophical environment. However, perhaps for philosophy to have an expansion similar to that, in addition to generosity, it also lacks some specific step in un-

derstanding its own nature.’ The direction of this step can be indicated to us by the “question of the young philosopher.” Their intensity is twofold: on the one hand, they are inspired by their utopianism, and, heeding the luminaries of their science, move with them in a historical-philosophical temporality; on the other hand, they abide in a generative passivity and crave to infinitely immerse themselves in the philosophy they have studied and then share this delightful experience with the world, help others experience what they have experienced. If, for the first temporality, we have socio-cultural conditions (education, enlightenment, consulting), for the second, we have no special conditions: it does not belong to philosophy as knowledge, and does not belong to the arts, since it concerns the history and theory of intellectual and spiritual culture, and also does not belong to various mindfulness practices, since it exists due to the extreme subjectivity of the philosopher and personal passion. And the young philosopher here points us to the temporality of myth. Their relation to philosophers and philosophy has the qualities of the archetypal numinosity, and we can research and cultivate this relation, but we do not do so because myth is deemed uncontrollable within the modern cultural landscape, and the symbol opening access to the waters of myth is often mixed with the sign. And although philosophy since Schelling’s time (gods-ideas) has attempted to enfold myth within its own thinking, myth within philosophy (as that which is shared-in-common) persists latently, as both a perspective and a utopia.

Here, we can cite as an example “The Birth of Tragedy...”, which not only calls for music to revive myth (it seems likely that something similar transpired in the sixties) but overall represents an extended project of a new way of thinking, on that establishing the dialectical unity of myth and discursive thinking. And later, for example, Heidegger has this same perspective in mind when, in “The time of the World Picture”, he dreams towards *to belong to being and yet to remain a stranger among beings*^[35].

However, these are only ghostly perspectives. They are so precise because here philosophers are required to take some new actions. In Badiou’s terms, this could be called a “political invention.” Is there an environment which could possibly be architected for a young philosopher to engage with the thought of the past to renew old

philosophers’ tunes and their ideas with the very poetic intensity that seizes both him and us in the act of understanding—and to do so with unhesitating abandon? To prevent this from becoming the same kind of “stultifying” construct, as Jacotot would have called it, such a philosophical environment must be imbued with an atmosphere in which both the producer and the recipient are open to a unique type of experience. This experience most closely resembles what Bachelard termed “poetic imagination,” specifically in terms of its dynamic character and its renewing power. Evidently, the analysis of philosophical acting has required, by analogy with Bachelard’s phenomenology of the poetic imagination, the undertaking of a phenomenology of the philosophical imagination.

If we speak precisely of the poetic renewal power, which springs from the capacity to resist the automatism of language, a capacity possessed in equal measure by rhythmic poetry and philosophy, then here “*we encounter the paradox of the originality of habitual action. The housewife’s chores do not so much impart a unique character to the house as return it to its archetype! Ah, life would expand its boundaries if each morning we could create all the things in the house anew with our own hands, if things ‘emerged’ from our hands! (...)... these are all blessings bestowed upon us by the imagination, which allows us to feel the house growing from within*”^[36]. “*A little more beautiful—and we already have a new thing. A tad more beautiful—and it is already a completely different thing*”^[36]. The philosophers, like anyone in love with their work, have much in common with this housewife, with the sole difference that a high symbolic culture is established in their “house,” and within it, there is a significantly greater amplitude, scope, intensity, and diversity of states of consciousness. And unlike the poet proper, the philosopher, as Nietzsche wrote, doesn’t use the “*crutches of rhythm*”^[26].

Let us clarify the semantic horizon of “myth” and “symbol.” Since myth in the form of ritual practices and without an external perspective is not given to us, for instance, the philosopher A.F. Losev proposes a distinction between “absolute” and “relative” mythology. Myth as *absolute mythology* is, by his definition, “*the highest in its concreteness, maximally intense, and in the greatest degree a tense reality. It is not an invention but—the most vivid and most genuine actuality*”^[37]. This refers to the authentic

myth, which is structured not on the principle of faith, nor on the principle of knowledge, but as a dialectical unity of the two. Our modern consciousness is, as a rule, randomly embedded in myth, and moreover, through an already-reflective relation to it. From the perspective of a healer, Jung writes the following about this: *“Everything is lost that is not thought about, that, consequently, does not enter into a meaningful relation with the improving mind”, and before it, “a void gapes, from which he turns away in fear. Worse still, the vacuum is filled with absurd political and social ideas, whose distinctive characteristic is spiritual emptiness”*^[27].

Moreover, the volatile structures of the already-reflective now carry cultural traumas that hinder mytho-poetic circulation. Thus, the Second World War with its accidental main symbol (the swastika) and other mass psychoses are already interpreted by Jung himself as archetypal explosions and invasions stemming from a deep symbolic crisis. Evidently, the era of the sixties with its music, the discovery of Eastern spirituality, quantum physics, and interest in philosophy and altered states of consciousness can be considered as the next stage in this modern history of myth. However, in contemporary philosophy, we for some reason do not see real consequences of this symbolic renaissance, and the modern cultural landscape, on the contrary, is increasingly inscribed in the image of Baudrillard’s “hyperreality”^[31]. Apparently, “simulacra” are a symptom of the fear of new mass psychoses and they can be understood as an attempt at control. The Beatles, apparently, caused such a mass reaction because they also tapped into some myths, but unlike the nightmares of the Second World War, they manifested the possibility of, for example, absolutely direct positive states, sharply standing out in the post-war world^[38]. However, the complex public reaction to them and, as a consequence, the dark pages of their biography (let’s add here some unfinished projects of the sixties like the hippies), demonstrate to us the presence of a deep crisis of the symbolic, which equally prevents the control of both the awakening of the destructive Wotan (here we rely on Jung’s famous work on the unfolding of the archetype of the god of war in the pre-war period^[39]) and the awakening of the creative god—Apollo. Given this state of myth, it is quite difficult to say that the philosophical environment should be open to the circulation of the

mytho-poetic.

What does philosophy need to be an environment in which the level of symbolic culture allows for the unfolding of some deep aesthetic experiences without destroying the essence of philosophy as an intense discursive practice?

To answer this question, let us now specify the horizon for understanding the symbolic. There are two main directions of interpreting the symbolic. The first essentially does not distinguish the symbol from the sign. Symbolism here is reduced to discursive ambiguity defined by contextual variations inherent in language. As a vivid representative of this direction, one can recall P. Ricoeur, for whom, in his own words, the symbol *“ceased to be an enigma, in other words, a bewitching and mystifying reality, because it requires a dual explanation: it belongs primarily to the sphere of multiple meaning and from this point of view there is nothing remarkable in symbolism as such; all words of ordinary language have more than one meaning”*^[40]. According to Kristeva, such an *“assimilation of the symbol into the sign”*^[41] is connected not so much with the internal development of the humanities as with the global historical process of desymbolization, or, as M. Weber called it, the “disenchantment of the world,” which began as early as the 13th century. R. Barthes also notes that *“this terminological shift testifies to a certain erosion of symbolic consciousness”*^[42].

The other tradition views the symbol rather as a constant that institutes the human and attempts to integrate the mytho-poetic into modern “disenchanted” thinking. This tradition, as is already evident, determines this article’s way of thinking about mytho-poiesis. This tradition has its beginnings in Kant’s third Critique, but develops in the works of Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche and further in the 20th century, most vividly manifested, for example, by Jung and Lacan, Cassirer, as well as in philosopher-poets (as designated by Badiou). In the Russian-speaking tradition, the works of P. Florensky^[43], G.G. Shpet^[44], A.F. Losev^[45], S. Averintsev^[46] are interesting. The Russian tradition may be of interest for its poetic freedom of theoretical formulations. Thus, Losev in “Essays on Ancient Symbolism and Mythology” writes that in working with the symbolic we operate *“not with purely static structures, but with actively positing structures, with ideally dynamic intelligent semantic charges”*^[45]. These *“dynamic seman-*

tic charges” create the symbolic dimension of thinking, which always (as a mandatory rule of the game) involves the Self in a transformation.

For example, Cassirer represents the philosopher as a master of symbolic forms, occupying in language “*the stage of symbolic expression*”, where “*the image does not exert a reverse influence on the spiritual as something independently thing-like, but is for it a pure expression of its own creative power*”^[6].

Philosophers who think in a similar way are always thinkers struggling with the aforementioned symbolic crisis through the creation of a “language” that non-reductively grasps and holds the vibrations of poetic imagination. Since the words myth, symbol, archetype are overloaded with contexts, in order to cultivate the utopia of a philosophical environment, we need some fresh terms. We propose to call this “collective” intellectual project the “already-non-reflective.”

Let us introduce an intuitively understandable triad: “non-reflective,” “reflective,” “already-non-reflective.” where the latter attunes us to such an image of thinking in which discursive thinking and myth are already in such a dynamic equilibrium that allows both thinking intensely and simultaneously having an amount of calm that allows for the induction, in oneself and in others, of the processes of poetic imagination unfolding in the thought. The amount of calm must be such that we not only allow a deep reaction to be but can also steadfastly stand, abide, hover, float in this “clearing”: that is, not only grasp but also hold this intense continuity. Among existing practices, demands of this kind of polyphonic complexity are made on a person, probably, only in music, and even then not in every one. This art often requires the simultaneous inclusion of different abilities. Perhaps that is precisely why Nietzsche attempts to create snares for the “already-non-reflective” in “The Birth of Tragedy...” through the play of music and myth. It is absolutely clear that in this work Nietzsche is no longer engaged in philology. What he calls Greek tragedy is his challenge to the reader, a proposal to hold the Apollonian, the Dionysian, and the third element, for which Nietzsche himself is responsible—thought with philosophical displacement.

We know that the musical works written by Nietzsche himself are not outstanding from a compositional point of view. But they apparently need to be approached

not from the point of view of music history, but at least from the point of view of the anthropology of music: as we reconstruct ancient musical instruments, so we need to reconstruct the mode of being of that person who not only wrote down notes but played. That is, his state of consciousness, in modern terms. That is, we need to become a philosopher who, playing the piano (rather simple pieces), conveys not feelings or moods, but their philosophical state, that is, induced by philosophy as a certain held discursive-symbolic act. If we relate to Nietzsche’s own music through his ideas, then here, in essence, everything should play out as in contemporary “non-composerly music”^[47].

However, the crisis of the symbolic in modernity takes on completely different dimensions due to the fact that natural centers of “absolute mythology” are becoming fewer and fewer. The bonfire of authentic experience has gone out, we no longer know how to light it, but we can only tell stories about it—this is how, for example, Agamben captures this situation in his work “The Fire and the Tale”^[48]. There is a law in this frightening historical darkness: “*everything that is rejected in the symbolic order reappears in the real*”^[49]. The destruction of absolute myths, traditions, ideologies, metanarratives, etc., generates a paradoxical situation in which the symbolic, from the conscious efforts (the existential function of ritual) that gather the human states epoch after epoch, manifests as the unconscious. That is, under conditions of an overproduction of signs, this unconscious is still not washed away but is discovered and acts as “*that part of the certain transindividual discourse that disappears in the disposition of the subject in order to restore the continuity of his conscious discourse*”^[50]. In these inverted conditions, philosophy turns out to be a truly salutogenic environment, since its way of talking mobilizes simultaneously both the discursive and symbolic forces of the addressee.

8. A Generative Struggle at the Myth-Creation Boundaries: The Psychic Intensity of Philosophical Poiesis

In Erich Fromm, we find the statement: “*Any idea is strong only if it is grounded in a person’s character struc-*

ture. *No idea is more potent than its emotional matrix*"^[51]. In relation to philosophy, this psychological idea is quite applicable, but it needs to be somewhat refined so as not to fall victim to the temptation of the philosophy of suspicion. Its method of interpretation is not appropriate here. Philosophical following of such an "emotional matrix" (even if it is a psychological complex) has a laborious character. Here, we are not talking about the process of individuation, as it might seem, but here we are talking about the fact that, in order to unfold one's idea in language (on the canvas of a treatise or living speech), the thinker needs to endure the "clearing of being", which, as we know, unfolds in the horizon of time^[52], and such time demands a significant investment of vital forces. In this sense, philosophical poesis is a topos of increased psychic intensity. "*War (Polemos) is the father of all, the king of all: it declares some gods, others—men, it makes some slaves, others—free*"^[53]. Such intensity stems from the fact that the philosopher is essentially a psychic explosion, an invasion of a singular psyche into the sluggish, averaged everydayness. We want to emphasize here that the philosopher is a topos in which the psyche unfolds in language.

Since pre-Socratic times, philosophers have striven to break through the inertia and automatism of language. Therefore, one cannot say that desymbolization is a symptom inherent exclusively in modern European rationality. Whether it is the creation of the best fundamental grammar of being, or a linguistic invention, or a renewal of previous ideas, philosophy has always integrated new (or old) ideas and states into the intellectual landscape, working against the stubborn inertia of language. One immediately recalls not only Heraclitus or Nietzsche but also Wittgenstein, Heidegger, as well as all sorts of artistic experiments with language. So, for example, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes two modalities of language: conventional language, as an established system of signs, the automatic language of everyday life, and the language of silence, returning to the extra-linguistic dimension of consciousness (the language of art and philosophy). "*What we mean is not in front of us, outside of all speech, as a pure meaning: [meaning] manifests itself within language only as an excess of what we live over what has already been said*"^[54].

Evidently, if the philosopher is not sick with "normal science" (Kuhn^[54]), they always subordinate their discurs-

sivity and ethics to psychic content. That is, they serve Nietzsche's "great health". This is what distinguishes the language of philosophy from all other languages. Fichte, in his striving for universal validity, writes: "*What philosophy one chooses depends on what kind of person one is: for a philosophical system is not a dead utensil that could be set aside or taken up at will; it is animated by the soul of the person*"^[55]. The thinking of the philosopher becomes psychic to that boundary after which grammar yields power over meanings. Unlike the poet, who still heeds the magic of language, the philosopher subordinates language to express psychic content more clearly, more purely. Sometimes, and even rather contrary to the usual, everyday logic of the "natural attitude" (Husserl^[56])—in order to notice thought itself. "*Reason in language—oh, what an old deceptive woman she is! I fear we will not get rid of God because we still believe in grammar...*"^[15].

Partly because of this, people who do not have a quality education are afraid of philosophy if it is not wrapped in a superficial sign. Since philosophy deals in a unique way with non-conscious spheres, its manifestation here and now acquires the qualities of energy, enthusiasm, pressure, the affect emanating from it, for an unprepared listener (and there are a majority of such), is easily stigmatized as subjectivism, ideological engagement, etc. That is, the nature, the psychic reality (in psychoanalytic terms) of the philosopher affects more strongly than the real content of his speech. In the dialogue "Meno," Socrates is compared to an electric ray: "*And now, it seems to me, you have bewitched and enchanted me and so spellbound me that I am full of confusion. And moreover, if I may make a joke, you are very like both in appearance and in other respects to the flat torpedo fish; for it benumbs anyone who approaches and touches it, and now you seem to have had that sort of effect on me—for I am benumbed in both soul and tongue, and I do not know how to answer you.(...) if you were to do the same in another state, you would be seized as a magician*"^[57]. In modern contexts, this imbalance is structurally similar to, for example, the charisma of a political leader, but the difference is that a political leader makes himself a topos for the convergence of alien forces randomly (Hegel calls Napoleon the world-soul precisely in this context), while the philosopher still follows the path of individuation, or, as Heraclitus would say—not a god,

not a man, but a free one. This ambivalent status of enthusiasm generates distrust towards the philosophizing person. Let us add: and towards our own inner philosopher as well. Therefore, the necessity arises to search for phenomena that constitute the philosophical environment, for example, as a space of legitimacy for intellectual enthusiasm, as a space for distinguishing living thought, etc.

A progressive example of a philosophical environment is the teaching of philosophy to children (e.g., the international movement Phil4Chill). Its development is conditioned, of course, not only by the fact that philosophy classes improve academic performance in all subjects^[58], but also by the fact that children's imagination appropriates language even more boldly than adults, and therefore responds to other psychic reality with its own^[59,60]. Herein lies the possibility of returning to the philosophical environment again appears. Because what unfolds is not so much useful training in soft skills, but a certain experience of thinking accessible only in philosophy.

The classes invented by Matthew Lipman are intended to be integrated into students' lives throughout their entire school education. They weave a single thread of conscious awareness through what is typically a blind acquisition of knowledge. The effectiveness of this approach is emphasized in the majority of contemporary research on Philosophy for Children (P4C)^[58,60-63].

However, in the adult world, there is no stable topos that an adult can have in mind when a free thought or a new mind experience suddenly knocks at the door of their mind. It exists, but it is virtual and it has no autonomy.

This gives rise to specific psychological difficulties which stem not from any personal traumas but from the very nature of thought itself. As Olivier Boether notes, *"The defining characteristic of philosophical curiosity is its compulsive quality. (...) While moderate curiosity enhances learning and creativity, excessive philosophical curiosity can become a form of cognitive addiction. The philosopher experiences questioning as both necessary and torturous, unable to find satisfaction in partial answers or practical solutions"*^[64]. This same dialectic, for example, Santayana aims to realize through his concept of 'normal madness,' which holds that a person must understand the chaotic element within their nature as the essential source from which harmonious reason arises. *"Each of these parts is breeding*

an inchoate spirit with an incipient rationality of its own. ... It is for him, in his sober equilibrium, to accept, use, interpret, and control these promptings. He is not mad for having them; they are the material for his rational synthesis. But if he lets any of them become dominant he is lost, and they also..."^[65]. So such difficulties arise not only in philosophers famous for their "madness," but in any people when they run into so-called "eternal" questions.

9. Awakened Thought vs. Emotional Energy: Re-Imagining "The Sociology of Philosophies"

We can attempt to outline the potential novelty of such a practice not only from within the philosophical endeavor itself. Let us try to examine the common features of how intellectual communities function. In the fundamental work *"The Sociology of Philosophies"* Randall Collins provides a detailed historical-sociological analysis of all major philosophical schools. This book could well serve as a handbook for a modern philosophical event manager or philosophical agent. What is of interest to us now are the prospects that emerge from the analysis of the stable structures governing the functioning of philosophical communities. In the categories of the "General Theory of Interactive Rituals" employed by Collins, philosophical communities function in much the same way as any community of intellectuals. They are similarly built upon archaic patterns: communities persist through time via "sacred objects" and the "emotional energy" derived from participation in "interactive rituals" built around these objects, around the revitalization of these symbols. Their difference from other communities lies in several key aspects. First, they create supremely abstract symbols (truth, wisdom, etc.), which tend to move away from emotional-aesthetic imagery in order to progress from a local to a cosmopolitan type of solidarity. Second, their interactive rituals are predominantly situations *"not aimed at socialization and lacking a practical character"*^[2]. "Intellectual discourse is implicitly focused on its autonomy from external concerns and on the reflexive awareness of itself"^[2]. Third, structurally, they consist of speech acts that refer back to a meaning-constituting text (cultural capital). That is, they are essentially the prolongation of some intellectual value in time. The

value of this action is perceived as absolute. Fourth, this process presupposes a very particular focusing of attention: the participants' attention is typically focused on a prolonged and complex speech act in which a certain argumentation on a given topic is presented, or a worldview is unfolded aloud.

On the one hand, given the complexity of the philosophical endeavor, these sociological observations may seem overly obvious, but on the other hand, in the context of such thematization, we can more accurately pinpoint certain details of the philosophical environment precisely *as a philosophical community*, and not merely as an intellectual one, which it became with the onset of the disenchantment of the world. The key change that could be realized in transforming modern philosophy into the format of a philosophical environment occurs in *how* a person, through interactive action, receives a charge of emotional energy. The intellectual atmosphere in which the modality of the already-non-reflective is formed—that is, where poetic imagination truly circulates with thought—is an atmosphere in which intellectual speech, throughout its entire course, turns out to be conditioned, like Socrates by his daimon, by the inner necessity of the Self (as Jung might say).

“Turns out to be,” because everyone is listening in a certain way. The focus of attention here, for example, is formed by a *generative passivity*, which allows for a real intellectual response to be born in reaction to someone's, perhaps even unskilled, thinking. The process of enrichment with cultural capital in such an environment occurs at the myth-creating boundaries in continuing thinking. That is, where one thinking ignites another in a random, epiphenomenal manner. When there is no clear connection between what one person said and what arose in another, it sparks a special kind of *philosophical inspiration*. The theory of interactive rituals presupposes an atomic image of society, in which “*individuals meet; their encounters possess, to varying degrees, properties that generate interactive rituals. (...) These encounters produce a continuous flow of social motivations, as people emerge from each situation with a stock of emotionally charged symbols (which can be called cultural capital) and with emotional energy*”^[2]. Unfortunately, when we try to speak sociologically, we can slip into schematism. Thus, for example, in the cited passage, thought stumbles upon a certain pre-

ponderance of having over being^[66]. For, obeying philosophical inspiration, we do not have emotional energy, but rather the awakened energy of our own thought. And we do not have social motivations, but rather a gaze into the non-human condition of the human, which philosophy has sought and continues to seek from pre-Socratics to posthumanism^[67,68].

10. Conclusions

Let us return to our starting point: the search for a way to establish philosophy as an independent, living environment in the modern world—to meet the demand for an “ecology of thinking” without betraying thought through simplification. This quest leads us not merely to the problems of modern education but to the very problem of the temporal regimes of the philosophical act itself.

Our inquiry has identified two fundamental flaws in its current predicament. First, philosophy has lost its connection to mythopoetic time—that intensive, symbolic temporality which alone can renew thought and nourish its periphery. Second, it remains locked within the hierarchical logic of explanation, where the philosopher-explainer faces a passive audience, thereby transforming living thought into a transaction of ready-made meanings.

Emerging from this double bind requires two interdependent conditions. To be realized as a whole, as an element, as an archetype, as a symbol, philosophy must:

—Non-reductively restore mythopoetic time to its practice, making it an organic dimension of the philosophical event.

—Adopt, as the basis of its social existence, the principle of the equality of intelligences (Jacotot–Rancière).

The crucial insight is that the second condition is not merely a benevolent gesture but an operational necessity for achieving the first. The principle of equality of intelligences performs decisive work here:

—It abolishes the figure of the exclusive mediator. As long as the philosopher monopolises the right to “correctly” interpret symbols and texts, myth remains either a museum piece or an esoteric secret, but not a living force capable of seizing thought.

Equality of intelligences removes this barrier, allowing everyone to enter into direct, unmediated contact with the symbolic dimension.

—It creates the social form for the “already-non-reflective.” The atmosphere in which discursive thought and mythopoetic imagination exist in dynamic equilibrium cannot be established by decree “from above.” It arises only through the practice of panecastic mutual learning, where participants, recognised a priori as equals, jointly attend to thought and allow it to resonate. This is precisely the space of generative passivity, where thought is awakened not by explanation but through an encounter with another thinking. It is on these myth-creation boundaries, at the point where individual intensities ignite one another, that genuine philosophical inspiration is born—the awakened energy of one’s own thought, not an assimilated cultural capital.

Thus, the method for cultivating a philosophical environment lies precisely in the practice of non-reductively integrating mythopoetic time through the affirmation of the equality of intelligences. This process itself constitutes the method for cultivating an environment where philosophy can exist autonomously, outside unfree discourses like “normal science.” The philosopher in such an environment is not a teacher but an “emancipatory guide,” who steps back from the power of explanation to curate the very space of possible encounter—to sustain these living myth-creation boundaries. This is no longer a purely theoretical perspective but the prospect of a new type of philosophical practice in which the existential moment of dialogue does not dissipate.

We understand the profound complexity of this task, especially when faced with effective competitors like yoga or psychoanalysis, and when one must attract an audience to an already intricate subject. Yet, we propose not to abandon the utopianism of the young philosopher and consider this article a methodological landmark—an intuitive pre-apprehension of a new social form for philosophy.

The outcome of our search is, therefore, a project: the project of a salutogenic philosophical environment that gains autonomy by holding mythos and logos in tense unity and accepting the equality of intelligences as its cornerstone. Its prototypes are the People’s University, the prac-

tice of philosophy with children, or free study circles—any form where thought circulates rather than is appropriated. Within such an environment, “ignorant” mutual learning under attentive guidance becomes possible, giving rise to self-organizing communities united by their capacity to cultivate the great periphery of philosophy. The task is to consciously cultivate this periphery, these boundaries where philosophy is created anew—where it can once again become a common cause, a generous, demanding, and independent element of human life. This article serves merely as a methodological landmark on this path.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, N.K.N. and S.V.S.; methodology, N.K.N. and S.V.S.; formal analysis, N.K.N. and S.V.S.; investigation, N.K.N. and S.V.S.; resources, N.K.N. and S.V.S.; data curation, N.K.N. and S.V.S.; writing, N.K.N. and S.V.S.; original draft preparation, N.K.N. and S.V.S.; writing—review and editing, N.K.N. and S.V.S.; supervision, N.K.N. and S.V.S.; project administration, N.K.N. and S.V.S. Both authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This work received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References

- [1] Sukhachev, V.Y., 2003. *The Study of Man: Main Approaches in Philosophical Anthropology* [PhD Thesis]. Available from: <https://www.dissercat.com/content/issledovanie-cheloveka-osnovnye-podkhody-v-filosofskoi-antropologii> (cited 16 November 2025). (in Russian)
- [2] Collins, R., 2000. *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA.
- [3] McIntyre, L., McHugh, N., Olasov, I. (Eds.), 2022. *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Wiley-Blackwell: Hoboken, NJ, USA. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119635253>
- [4] Ding, X., Pan, T., 2022. Philosophical practice as spiritual exercises towards truth, wisdom, and virtue. *Religions*. 13(4), 364. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13040364>
- [5] Merleau-Ponty, M., 2011. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Landes, D.A. (Trans.). Routledge: London, UK.
- [6] Cassirer, E., 2020. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 3: Phenomenology of Cognition*. Lofts, S.G. (Trans.). Routledge: London, UK.
- [7] Deleuze, G., Guattari, F., 1987. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Massumi, B. (Trans.). University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, MN, USA.
- [8] Agamben, G., 2009. "What is an Apparatus?" and Other Essays. Kishik, D., Pedatella, S. (Trans.). Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, USA.
- [9] Daily Stoic. What is Stoicism? A Definition and 9 Stoic Exercises to Get You Started. Available from: <https://dailystoic.com/> (cited 16 November 2025).
- [10] Mamardashvili, M.K., Levin, I.D., Shrader, Y.A., et al., 1991. *Questions of Philosophy*. Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences: Moscow, Russia. Available from: <https://djvu.online/file/NovY-CwYJwjSke> (in Russian)
- [11] Aristotle, 2016. *Metaphysics*. Ross, W.D. (Trans.). CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform: Scotts Valley, CA, USA.
- [12] Ayalon, N.L., 2025. Philosophical community from a historical perspective. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*. 110, 40–45. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.02.002>
- [13] Bachelard, G., 1987. *The Psychoanalysis of Fire*. Ross, A.C.M. (Trans.). Beacon Press: Boston, MA, USA.
- [14] Zhuang, Z., 1996. *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*. Watson, B. (Trans.). Columbia University Press: New York, NY, USA.
- [15] Nietzsche, F., 1978. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Kaufmann, W. (Trans.). Penguin Books: New York, NY, USA.
- [16] Grebenshchikov, B.B., 2018. *Songs and Texts*. Eksmo: Moscow, Russia. (in Russian)
- [17] Eyerman R., 2013. Social theory and trauma. *Acta Sociologica*. 56(1), 41–53.
- [18] Nussbaum M.C., 2010. *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA.
- [19] Onfray, M., 2004. *The Miseries (and Grandeur) of Philosophy*. Available from: <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2004/10/ONFRAY/11576> (cited 16 November 2025). (in French)
- [20] Rancière, J., 1999. *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, MN, USA.
- [21] Latour, B., 2005. *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.
- [22] Agamben, G., 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Heller-Roazen, D. (Trans.). Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, USA.
- [23] Mittelmark, M.B., Bauer, G.F., Vaandrager, L., et al. (Eds.), 2022. *The Handbook of Salutogenesis*, 2nd ed. Springer: Cham, Switzerland.
- [24] Badiou, A., 1999. *Manifesto for Philosophy*. Madarasz, N. (Trans.). State University of New York Press: Albany, NY, USA.
- [25] Goody, J., 2006. *The Theft of History*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK; New York, NY, USA.
- [26] Nietzsche, F., 1993. *The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music*. Tanner, M. (Ed.). Whiteside, S. (Trans.). Penguin Classics: London, UK.
- [27] Jung, C.G., 1991. *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, 2nd ed. Hull, R.F.C. (Trans.). Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA.
- [28] Beith, D., 2018. *The Birth of Sense: Generative Passivity in Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy*. Ohio University Press: Athens, OH, USA.
- [29] Merleau-Ponty, M., 1988. *In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays*. Wild, J., Edie, J.M., O'Neill, J. (Trans.). Northwestern University Press: Evanston, IL, USA.
- [30] Brenifier, O., 2020. *The Philosophical Consultation*. Available from: <https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/52662432-the-philosophical-consultation> (cited 16 November 2025).
- [31] Baudrillard, J., 1994. *Simulacra and Simulation*. Glaser, S.F. (Trans.). University of Michigan Press: Ann

- Arbor, MI, USA.
- [32] Rancière, J., 1991. *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*. Ross, K. (Trans.). Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, USA.
- [33] Shukla, A., 2023. Reviving the Classical Tradition: Philosophical Counseling for the 21st Century. *Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture*. 27(2), 2. Available from: <https://archium.ateneo.edu/budhi/vol27/iss2/2>
- [34] Ding, X., Harteloh, P., Pan, T., et al., 2024. The practical turn in philosophy: A revival of the ancient art of living through modern philosophical practice. *Metaphilosophy*. 55(4–5), 517–534.
- [35] Heidegger, M., 2002. The Age of the World Picture. In *Off the Beaten Track*. Young, J., Haynes, K. (Trans.). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. pp. 57–85.
- [36] Bachelard, G., 2014. *The Poetics of Space*. Jolas, M. (Trans.). Penguin Books: New York, NY, USA.
- [37] Losev, A.F., 2003. *The Dialectics of Myth*. Marchenkov, V. (Trans.). Routledge: London, UK.
- [38] MacDonald, I., 1994. *Revolution in the Head: The Beatles' Records and the Sixties*. Fourth Estate: London, UK.
- [39] Jung, C.G., 1970. *Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Volume 10: Civilization in Transition*. Adler, G., Hull, R.F.C. (Trans.). Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA.
- [40] Ricoeur, P., 2008. *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*. Ihde, D. (Ed.). Northwestern University Press: Evanston, IL, USA.
- [41] Kristeva, J., 1986. From Symbol to Sign. In: Moi, T. (Ed.). *The Kristeva Reader*. Columbia University Press: New York, NY, USA. pp. 62–73.
- [42] Barthes, R., 1972. *Mythologies*. Lavers, A. (Trans.). Hill and Wang: New York, NY, USA.
- [43] Florensky, P., 1997. *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth: An Essay in Orthodox Theodicy in Twelve Letters*. Jakim, B. (Trans.). Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA.
- [44] Shpet, G., 1991. *Appearance and Sense: Phenomenology as the Fundamental Science and Its Problems*. Springer: Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
- [45] Losev, A.F., 1993. *Essays on Ancient Symbolism and Mythology*. Mysl: Moscow, Russia. (in Russian)
- [46] Averintsev, S.S., 1977. *Poetics of Early Byzantine Literature*. Nauka: Moscow, Russia. (in Russian)
- [47] Martynov, V.I., 2002. *The End of the Time of Composers*. *Russkiy put'*: Moscow, Russia. (in Russian)
- [48] Agamben, G., 2017. *The Fire and the Tale*. Chiesa, L. (Trans.). Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, USA.
- [49] Lacan, J., 2004. The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud. In *Écrits: A Selection*. Fink, B. (Trans.). W. W. Norton & Company: New York, NY, USA; London, UK. pp. 412–441.
- [50] Lacan, J., 1993. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses, 1955–1956*. Miller, J.-A. (Ed.). Grigg, R. (Trans.). Routledge: New York, NY, USA.
- [51] Fromm, E., 1950. *Psychoanalysis and Religion*. Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, USA.
- [52] Heidegger, M., 2010. *Being and Time*. Stambaugh, J., Schmidt, D.J. (Trans.). State University of New York Press: Albany, NY, USA.
- [53] Waterfield, R., 2000. *The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and the Sophists*. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.
- [54] Kuhn, T.S., 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, USA.
- [55] Fichte, J.G., 1994. *Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings, 1797–1800*. Breazeale, D. (Ed. and Trans.). Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis, IN, USA.
- [56] Husserl, E., 1970. *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*. Carr, D. (Trans.). Northwestern University Press: Evanston, IL, USA.
- [57] Plato, 2002. *Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo*. Grube, G.M.A. (Trans.). Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis, IN, USA.
- [58] UNESCO, 1998. *Philosophy for Children: Report*. UNESCO: Paris, France. Available from: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000116115> (cited 16 November 2025).
- [59] Lahav Ayalon, N., 2017. Play and Myth in Plato's Phaedrus. *Childhood & Philosophy*. 13(26), 129–152. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.12957/CHILDPHILO.2017.26563>
- [60] Naldoniová, L., 2023. Philosophy and Creativity with Children: Lipman, Vygotsky, Rodari. *Ruch Filozoficzny*. 80(1), 51–67. Available from: <https://apcz.umk.pl/RF/article/view/46374>
- [61] Kizel, A. (Ed.), 2022. *Philosophy with Children and Teacher Education: Global Perspectives on Critical, Creative and Caring Thinking*. Routledge: London, UK. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003212737>
- [62] Kilby, B., 2025. Philosophy for/with Children: A Meta-Analysis. *International Journal of Contemporary Educational Research*. 12(1), 26–38. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.52380/ijcer.2025.12.1.703>
- [63] Wu, C., Chen, L., 2025. The Effects of Philosophy

- for Children on Children's Cognitive Development: A Three-Level Meta-Analysis. *Journal of Intelligence*. 13(10), 130. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence13100130>
- [64] Boether, O., 2025. The Philosopher's Burden: Curiosity as the Primary Problem for Philosophers and the Failure of Imagination among Non-Philosophers. Available from: <https://philarchive.org/rec/BOET-PB-2> (cited 16 November 2025).
- [65] Vaiana., L., 2024. Normal Madness, or the Other Face of the Life of Reason. *Rocinante*. 15, 101–113. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.19267/24R008>
- [66] Marcel, G., 2022. *Being and Having*. Legare Street Press: Charleston, SC, USA.
- [67] Klumbyè, G., Jones, E., Braidotti, R. (Eds.), 2025. *Posthuman Convergences: Transdisciplinary Methods and Practices*. Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, UK.
- [68] Ferrando, F., 2020. *Philosophical Posthumanism*. Bloomsbury Academic: London, UK.