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REVIEW

Europarties in the European Parliament Elections-2024 and Their Impact on the EU Main Political Institutions Formation

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ABSTRACT

The article analyzes the results of European parties' participation in the 2024 European elections and their impact on the formation of key political institutions of the European Union, such as the European Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and others, as well as the changing balance of power between pro-European and Eurosceptic forces in the results of these elections, and their impact on the future prospects of the EU. The issues of resolving cultural and interethnic conflicts, which were of particular concern to the majority of European voters, played an important role in this election campaign. Another important issue of concern to European society was the problem of further strengthening the process of European economic, political and cultural integration. Based on the election results author concludes that although the pro-European forces, managed to maintain their dominant positions in the leading EU institutions, the dissatisfaction of a significant number of European citizens with the undemocratic and non-transparent formation and activities of the leadership of the major EU institutions remains in place, and in a number of EU countries it is even growing. Thus, following the results of these elections, the third largest right-wing conservative Eurosceptic parliamentary group named Patriots for Europe has been formed in the EP, which declares itself the main opposition force. The most radical members of the EP formed an even more rigid Eurosceptic Europe of Sovereign Nations Group. In the near future, this may cause serious threats to the stability and effectiveness of the EU.

Keywords: European Parties; European Elections; European Parliament; Euro-Optimists; Euro Sceptics; European Commission; European Council

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1. Introduction

The object of the presented research is participation of pan-European parties (Euro parties) in the pan-European elections of deputies to the European Parliament (DEP), held on June 6–9, 2024, in which representatives of these parties, as well as a number of independent candidates, participated. The subject of the research is the results of the European parties' participation in the European Elections 2024, including their impact on the formation of the governing bodies of the major EU political institutions, such as the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission (EC). The main purpose of the study is to identify how these parties and their factions in the European Parliament will affect the policies of these institutions, as well as the very model of the political representation in the EU, including changing the role of representative authorities, both at the pan-European and national levels.

On June 6–9, 2024, the 10th elections for the new composition of the European Parliament (EP) were held in 27 EU countries, in which 10 European political parties (Euro parties) officially registered in the EU took part. They are: “European People’s Party” (EPP), “Party of European Socialists” (PES), “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe” (ALDE), “European Democratic Party” (EDP), “European Green Party” (EGP), “European Free Alliance” (EFA), “Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists” (AECR), “Identity and Democracy” (IiD), “Party of the European Left” (PEL) and “European Christian Political Movement” (ECPM). Four Euro parties, namely the Social Liberal Federalist “Volt Europa” Party, the “European Pirate Party”, anti-imperialist “European Communist Action” (ECA) and “EU Animal Policy”, which do not have this registration, also took part in the elections. Traditionally, the EPP, PES, ALDE, EDP, EGP, EFA, as well as Volt Europe and the European Pirate Party have supported the development and strengthening of the EU (Euro optimists), while the ECR, IiD, ECPM, PEL and the ECA have been critical of the EU as a political and economic integration association (Euro sceptics) ^[1].

This event had a major impact on the transformation of the EU’s political map, when the right-wing radical Eurosceptic parties that came to power in Hungary, Italy and

the Netherlands and strengthened their positions in other EU countries, such as Austria, Germany, Lithuania, France, Finland, Sweden, etc., have started playing an increasingly important role.

A number of publications were dedicated to this event in the Western and Russian scientific literature, which focused on the discussion of the results of these elections, both at the pan-European level and within individual EU member states. L. Babynina analyzed the impact of the leading candidate principle in the election of the European Commission President, as well as the change in the balance of power between the major institutions of the EU ^[2]. P. Joannin’s work focused on the analysis of a new coalition majority formation in the European Parliament and its impact on the future policy of this institution, taking into account strengthening of the right-wing parties’ positions in it ^[3]. A number of authors of the POLITICO.eu Edition presented the actual information about the process of approval of the President of the European Council and formation of new composition of the EC in a series of publications ^[4–5].

2. Materials and Methods

The methodology of this study was based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the results of the Eurovision elections in Germany in 2019 and 2024, a qualitative content analysis of the program documents of the leading European parties and key materials related to the activities of the European Parliament, as well as scientific monographs and articles by Western and Russian scientists devoted to the study of the modern pan-European party and political system.

Since the end of the twentieth century, in the process of transformation of the institution of political parties, a new trend has emerged related to the development of globalization, which is reflected in the creation of so-called supranational parties, exemplified by pan-European or European parties. They were studied by such authors as Deschouwer K., Johansson M. Van Hecke, S., et al. ^[6–8].

It was also important for the European parties and especially their factions in the EP that the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties significantly equalized the powers of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in the legislative sphere, and now the Council could

not make any important decisions without their approval by the European Parliament. The European Parliament has been given the right to set up its own Investigative Committee, require reports from other EU institutions and, if they violate EU law, apply to the European Court of Justice. The Parliament also elects the European Ombudsman, who has the right to consider complaints and petitions from any EU citizen or public organization against all institutions of the Union on issues within the competence of the EU. As a result of all these reforms, the European Parliament and its factions began to play a more prominent and important role in the EU political system, taking an appropriate position in the legislative process along with the Council of the European Union.

Summing up the analysis of the process of institutionalization of European parties, it should be noted that in a relatively short period (from the mid-70s of the XX century to the mid-noughties of the XXI century, these parties and their parliamentary factions managed to gain a foothold in the political arena of the European Union, achieved financial and political independence^[9,10], have significantly expanded their ranks by including a significant number of new member parties from both new and old Union States.

3. Results

3.1. The Impact of Cultural Conflicts on the European Parliament Elections in 2024

The global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 and the migration crisis in Europe in 2018 led to the fact that the topic of interethnic and intercultural relations occupied an important place in political discourse for a long time, especially during national and pan-European elections. The consequence of this was a sharp increase in the role and influence of right-wing radical parties in Europe, which in 2019 managed for the first time to form their own European Identity and Democracy party and its faction in the European Parliament with a similar name^[11].

As a result, in Europe over the past five years, socio-economic issues related to conflicts over the redistribution of funds from the state budget, the implementation of various kinds of reforms: environmental, educational, healthcare, pension, etc., have increasingly been replaced by discussions about conflicts over cultural and social values

and norms. These conflicts were often viewed as expressions of conflicting cultural positions and group identities. They were particularly acute in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where the level of economic development and life of the majority of the population lagged significantly behind the countries of Western Europe^[12].

Almost all European parties. Those who participated in these elections paid great attention in their pre-election manifestos to the problem of resolving cultural and interethnic conflicts, realizing that these issues are of great concern to the majority of European voters, especially in Central and Eastern European countries^[13]. At the same time, the center-left parties: PES, ALDE, PEZ, and EDP emphasized the need for peaceful and consensual resolution of such conflicts, while the right-wing radical parties: The ECR and the IiD insisted on the need to radically reduce migration and restrict access to EU countries by representatives of other cultures and nationalities.

3.2. On the Problem of Further Strengthening Economic, Political and Cultural Integration Within the European Union

During this election campaign, the majority of European parties paid great attention to the issue of further strengthening economic, political and cultural integration within the EU. Many Western researchers have stated in recent years that over the past five years, the European Union has transformed from an international organization into a full-fledged political entity, whose socio-political system is intricately intertwined with the corresponding systems of its member states. All this is accompanied by an increase in the politicization of most EU-related issues, which have become increasingly discussed by parties and their factions in the European Parliament, as well as play an important role in voters' electoral decisions. It is no coincidence that already at the beginning of the 21st century several European parties and movements appeared in Europe advocating its federalization: the New Europeans (2005), the European Federalist Party (2011), the Movement for Democracy in Europe (2015), the Volt Europe Party (2017), etc.^[1].

Thus, it can be stated that the processes of European integration and Europeanization, which have led not only to an increase in the number of EU member states, but also to the strengthening of its economic base, political and

cultural superstructure, have recently acquired an irreversible character, including by strengthening ties between the main political institutions of the EU (European Parliament, European Commission) and European parties with representatives of business elites and civil society through the further development of communication between them ^[14,15].

3.3. New Structure of the European Parliament: Reasons for Changes and Possible Consequences

The results of these elections and their comparison with the results of the 2019 European elections, presented in **Table 1**, were generally in line with the forecasts. The turnout in the EU as a whole was 51.05%, which turned out to be the highest figure since 1999.

Table 1. Results of the Elections of Deputies to the European Parliament in 2024 and Their Comparison with the Results of the Previous Elections of 2019.

No	Parliamentary Group in the EP (European Party)	10.06.2024	30.06.2019
		Number of DEPs (% DEP)	Number of DEPs (% DEP)
1	European People's Party, EPP (EPP)	189 (26,25%)	182 (24,25%)
2	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, PASD (PES)	136 (18,90%)	154 (20,50%)
3	European Conservatives and Reformists, ECR (ECR)	83 (11,55%)	62 (8,25%)
4	Unite Europe, UE (ALDE)	74 (10,30%)	108 (14,40%)
5	Identity and Democracy, IiD (IiD)	58 (8,10%)	71 (9,70%)
6	The Greens-European Free Alliance, G-EFA (EGP, EFA)	51 (7,10%)	74 (9,85%)
7	United European Left-Left Greens of the North, UEL-LGN (PEL)	39 (5,40%)	41 (5,45%)
8	Independent	45 (6,25%)	57 (7,60%)
	Total	720 (100%)	751 (100%)

When the election results were summed up, negotiations between representatives of all groups with independent and undecided DEPs began. One of the most active participants in these negotiations was Viktor Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister and Leader of the Fides Party, which left the EPP in March 2021, and its deputies left the EPP group. Even before the elections, Mr. Orban expressed

a desire to bring his party to the ECR. However, ECR leader, Italian Prime Minister G. Meloni, decided to wait for the results of the European elections ^[16]. Negotiations between Mr. Orban and Mr. Meloni after the elections failed, and the Hungarian leader proposed to former Prime Minister of the Czech Republic and Leader of the ANO party, A. Babis, as well as to leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, G. Kikl, to form a new parliamentary group named "Patriots for Europe" (PfE) ^[17]. On June 30 2024, the leaders of three parties signed the "Patriotic Manifesto for a European Future", the main provisions of which state: more sovereignty for the EU member states, tougher combat against illegal migration and revision of the Green Deal. Later, a number of former IiD group member parties joined their initiative, namely the Italian League, the French National Rally (NR), the Belgian Flemish Interest, the Danish People's Party, the Greek Voice of Reason Party, the Dutch Freedom Party, and the Portuguese Chega, as well as the Spanish Vox Party, which left the ECR, and several other small parties from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and Poland. Thus, it has become possible to form a new parliamentary group of the European Union, which included 84 DEPs, making it the third largest^① group. Chairperson of NR J. Bardella, who has become the leader of this group, stated that his group would be the major opposition to the coalition of Euro optimists in the European Parliament ^[18]. In September 2024, the European Identity and Democracy Party was renamed to Patriots for Europe.

In turn, 14 DEPs from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) Party, which was excluded from the IiD before the elections, announced the creation of another the most radical Eurosceptic parliamentary group, named Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), which was joined by three DEPs from Bulgaria and Poland, and by one DEP from Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, France and Czech Republic. Thus, the total number of DEPs in this group reached the amount of the minimum required 25 DEPs, which made it the smallest group in the EP of the 10th Convocation ^[19]. The ESN is co-chaired by R. Aust (AfD) and S. Tishka (New Hope, Poland). The DEPs from this group also announced the creation of their own European party with the same name.

① On October 1, 2024, 2 more DEPs from the Polish National Movement Party later joined the group.

Thus, on August 20 2024, the structure of the European Parliament looked as follows (see **Table 2**)^[20].

Table 2. Composition of Parliamentary Groups in the EP on 20.08.2024^[20].

No	Group of the EP (European Party)	10.06.2024, following the results of the elections	
		Number of DEP	% DEP
1	EPP (EPP, EFA, ECPM)	188	26,10%
2	PASD (PES)	136	18,90%
3	PfE (PfE, ECPM)	84	11,65%
4	ECR (ECR, EFA, ECPM)	78	10,85%
5	UE (ALDE, EDP)	77	10,70%
6	G-EFA (EGP3, EFA, Volt Europe)	53	7,35%
7	UEL-LGN (PEL, European Left Alliance [Ⓢ])	46	6,40%
8	ESN (ESN)	25	3,50%
9	Independent	33	4,55%
	Total	720	100%

Table 3 presents the results of the European elections of 2024 by EU member states and their comparison with the results of the European election of 2019.

Tables 1, 2 and 3 show that the success of the EPP is due to the good results of its member parties, as well as the generally effective election campaign. Conservatives prevailed in 13 EU member states: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain.

The PES slightly worsened its result, although it won in five EU member states: Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden. However, Social Democrats suffered serious defeats in Germany, Greece, Hungary and Poland.

The ECR party, led by G. Meloni, performed quite successfully, primarily due to the excellent results of its Brothers of Italy Party and the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS). Representatives of this party performed well in the Czech Republic, Greece, Spain and Sweden^[3].

ALDE suffered serious losses, having won only in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. However, it has still suf-

fered significant defeats in Germany, France, and the Netherlands. In addition, after the elections, seven DEPs from the Czech ANO party decided to withdraw from the UE group due to disagreement with its position on the Green Deal and migration policy^[21]. In addition, five DEPs elected from the Volt Europe Party, which is ideologically close to ALDE, refused to join the UE group due to the presence of DEPs from ANO in it and joined the G-EFA group^[22].

The size of the G-EFA group, representing the European Green Party and the European Free Alliance, was expected to decrease by almost a third due to the weak performance of the main party, the German Union of 90-Greens, a member of the EGP. The representatives of the EGP in Belgium, the Czech Republic and France did not perform very well.

The moderately Eurosceptic UEL-LGN group of the Party of the European Left eventually increased its membership due to the addition of 8 DEPs from the Italian Five Star Movement and the successful performance of the Unconquered France Party. At the same time, the Left party in Germany, which had been the leading party in PEL for many years, failed due to the fact that its former leader, S. Wagentknecht, who advocated the restoration of cooperation with Russia, left it and created a new party, named the Sarah Wagenknecht Union, which received 6 DEPs who currently have remained independent^[23].

Thus, in the 10th Convocation of the European Parliament, the right-wing Eurosceptic groups, namely the PfE, the ECR and the ESN have 187 DEPs, or 26% of their total number. The left-wing moderately Eurosceptic UEL-LGN group has 46 DEPs or 6.4%. Thus, the correlation of forces between the pro-European (EPP, PASD, UE and G-EFA) DEPs and the Eurosceptic (PfE, ECR, ESN and UEL-LGN) DEPs is 454 (63%) to 233 (32.5%) against 518 DEPs (69%) to 154 DEPs (20.5%) in 2019, which indicates an almost 50% increase of the positions of Eurosceptics. Moreover, this trend has continued and even has become stronger since the 2009 European elections.

All this indicates that the influence of Eurosceptic forces on the EP, as well as the European Council and the EC, will also increase, forcing them to pay more attention to the key issues that these parties raise among voters: migration, the green deal, the Ukrainian conflict, etc.^[24].

Ⓢ The European Left Alliance is a European party with no official registration, formed in August 2024 as a result of the separation of 7 parties from Denmark, Spain (Podemos), Poland, Portugal, France (Unconquered France), Finland and Sweden.

Table 3. Final Results of the 2024 EP Elections for all EU Member States (2019 Election Results in Parentheses).

No	Country	Number of DEP	EPP	PASD	UE	G-EFA	PfE	ECR	UEL-LGN	ESN	Ind.
1	Austria	20 (18)	5 (7)	5 (5)	2 (1)	2 (2)	6 (3)	- (-)	- (-)	-	- (-)
2	Belgium	22 (21)	3 (4)	4 (3)	5 (4)	2 (3)	3 (3)	3 (3)	2 (1)	-	- (-)
3	Bulgaria	17 (17)	6 (7)	2 (5)	5 (3)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (2)	- (-)	3	- (-)
4	Croatia	12 (11)	6 (4)	4 (3)	- (1)	1 (-)	- (-)	1 (1)	- (-)	-	- (2)
5	Cyprus	6 (6)	2 (2)	1 (2)	-	-	-	1 (-)	1 (2)	-	1 (-)
6	Czech Republic	21 (21)	5 (5)	- (-)	- (6)	1 (3)	9 (2)	3 (4)	- (1)	1	2 (-)
7	Denmark	15 (13)	2 (1)	3 (3)	4 (5)	3 (2)	1 (-)	1 (1)	1 (1)	-	- (-)
8	Estonia	7 (6)	2 (-)	2 (2)	2 (3)	- (-)	- (1)	1 (-)	- (-)	-	- (-)
9	Finland	15 (13)	4 (3)	2 (2)	3 (3)	2 (2)	- (2)	1 (-)	3 (1)	-	- (-)
10	France	81 (74)	6 (8)	13 (5)	13 (21)	5 (12)	30 (22)	4 (-)	9 (6)	1	- (-)
11	Germany	96 (96)	31 (29)	14 (16)	8 (7)	15 (25)	- (11)	- (1)	4 (6)	14	10 (1)
12	Greece	21 (21)	7 (8)	3 (2)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	2 (1)	4 (6)	-	4 (4)
13	Hungary	21 (21)	7 (13)	2 (5)	- (2)	- (-)	11 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1	- (1)
14	Ireland	14 (11)	4 (4)	1 (-)	6 (1)	- (2)	- (-)	- (-)	3 (4)	-	- (-)
15	Italy	76 (73)	9 (7)	21 (19)	- (-)	4 (-)	8 (28)	24 (5)	10 (-)	-	- (14)
16	Latvia	9 (8)	2 (2)	1 (2)	1 (-)	1 (1)	1 (-)	3 (2)	- (-)	-	- (1)
17	Lithuania	11 (11)	3 (4)	2 (2)	2 (2)	1 (2)	- (-)	2 (1)	- (-)	1	- (-)
18	Luxembourg	6 (6)	2 (2)	1 (1)	1 (2)	1 (1)	-	1 (-)	- (-)	-	- (-)
19	Malta	6 (6)	3 (2)	3 (4)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	-	- (-)
20	Netherlands	31 (26)	6 (6)	4 (6)	7 (6)	6 (3)	6 (-)	1 (4)	1 (1)	-	- (-)
21	Poland	53 (51)	23 (17)	3 (8)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	20 (26)	- (-)	3	3 (-)
22	Portugal	21 (21)	7 (7)	8 (9)	2 (-)	- (1)	2 (-)	- (-)	2 (4)	-	- (-)
23	Romania	33 (32)	10 (14)	11 (10)	3 (8)	1 (-)	- (-)	6 (-)	- (-)	-	2 (-)
24	Slovakia	15 (13)	1 (4)	- (3)	6 (2)	- (-)	- (-)	- (2)	- (-)	1	7 (2)
25	Slovenia	9 (8)	5 (4)	1 (2)	2 (2)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	-	- (-)
26	Spain	61 (54)	22 (12)	20 (20)	1 (8)	4 (2)	6 (-)	- (3)	4 (6)	-	4 (3)
27	Sweden	21 (20)	5 (6)	5 (5)	3 (3)	3 (2)	- (-)	3 (3)	2 (1)	-	- (-)
	TOTAL	720	188	136	77	53	84	78	46	25	33

3.4. Change of Leadership of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission in the Result of a Deal Between the Leaders of the Major EU Member States and European Parties

According to the established tradition, after the sum up of the results of the European elections, representatives of the three leading pro-European parties (EPP, PES and ALDE), develop recommendations for the European Coun-

cil on the distribution of the leadership positions in the major political institutions of the EU, taking into account political, geographical and gender aspects, which, after their approval at the summit of the Heads of the Union member states, are submitted to the European Parliament (with the exception of the candidacy for the President of the European Council) ^[25].

Currently, the negotiation group has been composed of six people: Prime Minister of Greece K. Mitsotakis and Prime Minister of Poland D. Tusk (from the EPP), Span-

ish Prime Minister P. Sanchez and German Chancellor O. Scholz (from the PES), as well as French President E. Macron and Dutch Prime Minister M. Rutte (from ALDE). At the end of June 2024, they agreed on the following distribution of the leadership positions: former Portuguese Prime Minister A. Costa (PESCE) will become President of the European Council, current EC President Ursula von der Leyen (EPP) and EP Speaker R. Metsola (Malta, EPP) retain their posts, and, finally, Estonian Prime Minister K. Kallas (ALDE) will be the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-Chairman of the EC^[26]. However, currently the approval of these candidates by the European Council has not been entirely smooth. G. Meloni expressed her dissatisfaction with the fact that she and her ECR party were not allowed to participate in the negotiations and stated that she would not support the proposed candidates. Orban also expressed his dissatisfaction with the current procedure for nominating candidates for the top EU posts, saying that they should not represent just leftists and liberals, but every member state, and voted against U. von der Leyen^[27].

On July 16, 2024, MEPs voted to approve R. Metsola as their speaker for the next 2.5 years, which was supported by 526 DEPs. She was opposed by the DEP, former Spanish Minister for Equality, I. Montero (UEL-LGN), who received 61 DEPs' votes in her support. After her election, Metsola promised to continue fighting for granting the EP the right of legislative initiative^[28].

On June 18, 2024, the European Parliament considered the approval of U. von der Leyen as President of the European Commission, who held a series of meetings with each parliamentary group and individual influential members of the European Parliament the day before. During those meetings, she made promises, which were expected from her by the representatives of these groups. For example, paying tribute to the EPP, von der Leyen announced that increasing the competitiveness of the European economy would be a top priority of her new Commission. In addition, taking into account the sentiments of the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens, she promised to expand the "Green Deal", making it an ambitious climate goal until 2040 and to include in it a program to stimulate the creation of environmentally friendly technologies^[29]. Thus, 401 DEPs voted for U. von der Leyen's candidacy,

284 voted against her, 7 abstained in the voting and 7 ballots were declared invalid^[5].

A serious confrontation between Euro optimists and Euro sceptics occurred in connection with the distribution of leadership positions in the EP. As it is known, in the previous 9th Convocation of the EP, the IiD group was excluded from the distribution of the leadership positions process. Currently, the PfiE group, which, according to its size, could pretend to occupy two positions of Committee Chairmen and eight positions of Committee Vice-Chairmen, but the EPP, PASD, UE and G-EFA groups again decided to form a sanitary corridor around the PfiE and ESN, preventing them from participating in the distribution of leadership positions.

The new distribution of forces in the EP has noticeably affected the distribution of posts of Vice-Presidents of the EP, Heads of Standing Parliamentary Committees and Group Coordinators within the Committees.

The distribution of four posts of Vice-Presidents of the EP is considerably different in comparison with the previous ninth convocation of the EP. The EPP will have only three posts of Vice-Presidents of the EP (minus two compared to 2019), the PASD, on the contrary, will have five Posts of Vice-Presidents (+ 2), the OE has retained two posts of Vice-Presidents, and the EU will have only one post of Vice-President (-1).

The EPP has retained the leadership of 8 out of 22 Committees and 2 sub Committees, and will also have 32 Deputy Heads of the Committees. The PASD group lost two posts and now its representatives will lead 5 Committees plus 23 Deputy Heads of the Committees. The OE Group has received 4 posts of Heads of Committees and 12 Deputy Heads, while the EU Group has received two Heads (+1) and 7 Deputy Heads.

At the same time, the ECR group, which is only the fourth largest one, will have two Vice-Speakers (one more than in 2019), one Questor, three Heads of Committees (on Budget, on Petitions and on Agriculture) and 11 Deputy Heads. Even the left-wing radical group UEL-LGN retained one Deputy Speaker post, 2 posts of the Heads of the Committees (on Taxes and on Employment and Social Issues) and 5 Deputy Heads posts.

It is interesting to analyze the geographical distribution of senior positions in the EP. In the current convoca-

tion of the European Parliament, Germany will retain its dominance: two of its representatives will be Vice-Presidents and seven representatives will be Heads the Permanent Parliamentary Committees. Spain will have one Vice-Speaker and four Committee Heads, Italy will have two Vice-Speakers and three Committee Heads, France will have one Vice-Speaker and three Committee Heads, Belgium will have one Vice-Speaker and two Committee Heads, Belgium and Denmark will have two Vice-Speakers each and Greece and Finland will have two Committee Heads each. At the same time, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe retained 5 posts of Vice-Presidents of the EP, but in 2019 there were two representatives from Hungary, two representatives from the Czech Republic and one representative from Poland, and now there are two representatives from Romania and one representative from Latvia, Poland and Slovakia each. As to the leadership of the EP Committees, Poland will now have two Heads, while Romania and the Czech Republic will have one each ^[30].

Thus, the leadership of the 10th Convocation of the European Parliament has continued its policy of isolation towards right-wing radical Euro sceptics, which, in the opinion of many European politicians and experts, contradicts both its regulations and European democratic values, including guarantees of representation to those political parties that received electoral support. Given the persistence and increase of serious migration and socio-economic problems in Europe over the past 15–20 years, the influence of populists, right-wing radicals and euro sceptics continues to grow both throughout Europe (see the results of the 2019 and 2024 European elections), and at the national levels (parliamentary elections in Germany and the Czech Republic in 2021, Hungary, Italy and Sweden in 2022, Slovakia and Finland in 2023, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Portugal in 2024).

It is important to remember that according to the regulations of the EP, the re-election of its leadership will take place in 2.5 years. Moreover, it can be assumed that during this time, there may be positive changes in relations of Euro optimists with the PpE, but not with the ESN, which will allow DEPs from PpE to claim to occupy a number of leadership positions in the EP.

The first six months of the European Parliament

function have shown that the relations among parliamentary groups of the leading pro-European parties (EPP, PES, ALDE, EGP) can be characterized as “cooperation-confrontation”. On issues such as defense and security, the Ukrainian conflict, migration, and opposition to China and Trump, they shared almost a common position. However, the attitude of these groups and the parties behind them to issues related to the environment, economy, and social policy was considerably different. The group of moderately Eurosceptic ECR party often supported these groups on security issues and the Ukrainian crisis, but on other issues it took an independent position (migration, opposition to China), sometimes joining the conservatives from the EPP, and then criticizing them, PASD, ALDE and G-EFA (economy, social politics, relations with the United States, national sovereignty).

As for the right-wing radical European parties PpE and ESN and their groups in the EP, they opposed the Euro optimists on almost all issues, especially on issues such as the Ukrainian conflict, migration, and national sovereignty). For example, in December 2024, the PpE group adopted the Budapest Declaration, in which it expressed disagreement with the current migration pact of the European Union, which does not solve the problems Europe faces in relation to migration. The patriots called for a complete restructuring of the EU’s migration policy, emphasizing the need for the protection of external borders and curtailing illegal immigration. Leader of the group J. Bardella called on the EU member states to establish their own immigration rules that would allow them to ignore the EU migration policy. He warned European leaders who refuse to solve the problem of mass migration of bad consequences and called on the EU to lift sanctions against member states taking measures to curb illegal migration ^[31].

The deputies from the ESN group stated regarding the Ukrainian conflict that U. von der Leyen’s appeal for “mass arming” of Ukraine means that additional billions of European dollars will be spent to prepare Ukraine for war. Deputy of this group A. Sell (AfD) noted that European citizens want peace and stability, and that the aggressive position of the head of the EC contradicts interests of the peoples of both Ukraine and Europe completely, and added that while the United States is conducting a dialogue with Russia at the negotiation table, the EC urges to continue

the bloodshed instead of finally ending it. According to the Sovereignists, it is unacceptable that this conflict drags on thanks to the multibillion-dollar aid packages provided by the European taxpayers, while people on the ground continue to be used as chess pawns in the game of international powers^[32].

The following changes took place in the representation of the leading European parties in the new composition of the EC, compared to the previous composition at the beginning of 2024: EPP will now have 13 Commissioners (there were 11), the PES will have 5 (there were 8), the ALDE will have 3 (there were 6), the ECR will have 1 (there was 1), EPP will have none (there was 1), the independents will have 5 (there were none). The approval of the new composition of the European Commission in the EP was significantly affected by the negotiations between the parliamentary groups of the euro-parties, which were supported by their leaders, since in the period from November 4 to November 12, 2024, candidates for European commissioners held hearings in the relevant committees of the parliament. For his approval, each candidate had to enlist the support of at least 2/3 of the deputy votes in each of the committees. At the first stage, when 20 ordinary European commissioners were considered, the parliamentary groups were able to reach a package agreement, and their approval went quite smoothly. For example, the ECR group did not object to the candidacy of P. Serafin (EPP), nominated by D. Tusk's party for the post of EC member responsible for finance, anti-fraud and public administration, although in this group 20 out of 78 DEPs represented PiS, the main opposition party of Poland. The only problem arose when approving the candidacy of the European Commissioner responsible for health and animal protection, O. Varhegyi (Hungary, PEF), who was opposed by MEPs from PASD and OE, because they did not want to forgive Hungary for being the only EU member state, which distributed vaccines against COVID from Russia and China, not approved in the EU^[33].

However, the most serious problems in relations between the groups arose during the discussion of the candidacies of six U. von der Leyen Deputies. For example, the PASD, UE and G-EFA groups refused to support the candidacy of R. Fitto (Italy, ECR); and the EPP group made it a condition for the approval of T. Ribera's candi-

dacy (Spain, PES) so that she would respond to questions from members of the Spanish Parliament about her role as Minister of Environmental Affairs during the recent floods in Valencia. As a result, at the end of the hearings on all 6 Vice-Presidents of the EC (H. Virkkunen (Finland, EPP); K. Kallas; R. Minzatu (Romania, PES); T. Ribera, S. Sejournet (France, ALDE) and R. Fitto, it was decided to postpone their approval. On November 20 2024, after a series of consultations between the heads of the EC and EP with the heads of the leading groups, a consensus was reached and all 26 candidates for European commissioners received the necessary support from the DEPs^[33]. At the plenary session on November 27 2024, the EP approved the new composition of the EC, which is expected to start working on December 1, 2024.

On the same day, the post of the European Council was taken by A. Costa, who has Indian-Mozambican roots and has become the first representative of an ethnic minority to lead this key institution of the European Union. He says that the EU needs to establish closer relations with various regions and countries, which play important roles in the world that is much bigger than G7 or G20. Costa outlined the following priorities in his new post: developing a common position on European defense, preparing reasonable responses to potential trade wars with the United States and China, and agreeing on a new seven-year EU budget. For their successful implementation, Costa visited all 27 Heads of government of the EU member states in the autumn of 2024 in order, as he noted, "to ensure unity among all ... and this means being in constant contact."

In addition, according to a number of experts and politicians, it will be very important for him to maintain regular contacts with EC President U. von der Leyen, which radically distinguishes him from his predecessor Ch. Michel, who was at odds with the head of the European Commission for almost all five years of his Presidency^[34].

4. Discussion

This study is a continuation of a number of studies conducted by the author and other scientists devoted to the study of the institute of European Parties and their participation in the European elections. The results of the presented research contribute to the study of this relatively new pan-European political institution, which is the Euro-

pean parties, including their role in resolving existing and new ideological, political and cultural conflicts that play an important role in the formation and development of the pan-European political, ideological and cultural space.

They will undoubtedly help researchers who will continue to work on these institutions, including the activities of the factions of the European parties in the current composition of the European Parliament, as well as the next European elections, in which the current European parties will play a key role.

5. Conclusions

The results of the 2024 European Parliament elections demonstrated that the events in Europe over the past 5 years, such as increased migration, worsening of the socio-economic situation, and increase in the number of conflicts, including cultural and interethnic ones, as well as Russian-Ukrainian, have considerably affected the political preferences of the European citizens. It has become evident in the decline in the electoral attractiveness of traditional Euro optimistic parties in countries such as Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and others, and in the increase of the popularity of Euro sceptics, who are now represented in the parliaments and governments of most of the union's member states, and they are even leaders in Hungary and Italy. Nevertheless, the Conservatives, Socialists, Liberals and Greens managed to win the majority of seats in the EP in the result of these European elections, which allowed them to retain control over the majority of leadership positions, allowing only moderate Euro sceptics from ECR and the PEL to occupy a few posts. The EPP, PES and ALDE also retained the vast majority of portfolios in the European Commission, but their attempts to reject the candidacies of European commissioners from ECR and PfiE were unsuccessful.

The growth of populism and nationalism in the future may lead to serious problems for the cohesion of the European Union and its policies. The increased influence of these parties may increase euroscepticism in politics, which will undermine efforts to integrate into the EU.

Migration remains a controversial issue in Europe. The results of these elections may lead to stricter migration controls, which the new composition of the European Par-

liament will insist on.

As technology continues to evolve, issues related to digital privacy, cybersecurity, and regulation will become even more relevant, affecting the regulatory framework across the EU.

At the same time, more and more heads of EU member states are demanding a review of the flawed practice of distributing leadership positions in the EP and EC between traditional parties not allowing them to participate in this process. It is likely that already during this EP cadence of 2.5 years redistribution of posts in the EP may occur.

In any case, the results of these elections strongly indicate that the model of political representation in the EU is gradually changing in accordance with the changes in the social structure of the European society and the political preferences of the citizens. This process will continue, which will affect the activities of the European and national parliaments, significantly complicating their function.

The results of the Eurovision 2024 may significantly change the trajectory of the EU's development in the coming years, having an impact on legislation, international relations and the overall unity of its member states.

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- The European Council for Foreign Relations. Policy Brief: <https://ecfr.eu/publication>
- American political digital newspaper company Politico.eu: <https://www.politico.eu>
- Robert Schuman Foundation web site: <https://www.rsff.eu>

www.robert-schuman.eu

- Different European scientific and research magazines: Journal of General Market Research, Representation, Party Politics, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Political science, Revista de Științe Politice
- Some Russian scientific and research magazines: Analytical papers of the Institute of Europe, RAS - <https://www.instituteofeurope.ru/publications/analytics/>
Reports of the Institute of Europe, RAS - <https://www.instituteofeurope.ru/publications/doklady-ie-ran/>

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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