Abstract

This essay explores the concept of "performative skepticism," a rhetorical strategy that mimics the language and principles of scientific skepticism, but is employed to shield beliefs and practices from rigorous empirical scrutiny. Unlike legitimate epistemic skepticism, a foundational component of scientific inquiry, performative skepticism exploits the appearance of critical inquiry to undermine evidence-based knowledge, particularly in the field of health. The analysis begins with a philosophical examination of skepticism, tracing its evolution from Cartesian doubt to the critical methodologies of Popper, Kuhn, and Feyerabend. It then distinguishes performative skepticism from legitimate skepticism, highlighting its asymmetric application of critical standards and reliance on the rhetorical appropriation of scientific language. This essay further examines how performative skepticism manifests in health practices, including anti-vaccine movements, alternative therapies, and digital misinformation. These cases illustrate how performative skepticism distorts scientific values, presenting unsubstantiated claims as though they were scientifically valid. Finally, this essay proposes criteria for distinguishing between legitimate skepticism and performative skepticism, emphasizing the need for proportionate scrutiny and methodological transparency. Understanding and countering performative skepticism are essential for preserving the integrity of science and protecting patients from unfounded interventions.

Keywords

EpistemologyEvidence-Based MedicineHealth CommunicationPseudoscienceSkepticism

References

  1. [1] Popper, K.R., 2002. The logic of scientific discovery. Psychology Press: Hove, UK. pp. 1–480.
  2. [2] Sackett, D.L., Rosenberg, W.M., Gray, J.A., et al., 1996. Evidence based medicine: what it is and what it isn’t. BMJ. 312(7023), 71–72. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.312.7023.71
  3. [3] Djulbegovic, B., Guyatt, G.H., 2017. Progress in evidence-based medicine: a quarter century on. Lancet. 390(10092), 415–423. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)31592-6
  4. [4] Bacchi, A.D., Bacchi, B.S., 2023. The relation between language and pseudoscientific practices. Journal of Evidence-Based Healthcare. 5, e4970. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17267/2675-021Xevidence.2023.e4970
  5. [5] Descartes, R., Cress, D.A., 1998. Discourse on method, 3rd ed. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.: Indianapolis, IN, USA. pp. 1–72.
  6. [6] Lakatos, I., Currie, G., Worrall, J., 1978. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (Philosophical Papers, Volume 1). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. pp. 1–250. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511621123
  7. [7] Kuhn, T.S., 1996. The structure of scientific revolutions, 3rd ed. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, USA. pp. 1–212.
  8. [8] Hoyningen-Huene, P., 2013. Systematicity: The Nature of Science. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK. pp. 1–336.
  9. [9] Comte, A., 1853. The positive philosophy of Auguste Comte: Volume 2. Martineau, H. (trans.). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. pp. 1–350. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511701467
  10. [10] Laudan, L., 1983. The Demise of the Demarcation Problem. In: Cohen, R.S., Laudan, L. (eds.). Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honour of Adolf Grünbaum. Springer: Dordrecht, Netherlands. pp. 111–127. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7055-7_6
  11. [11] Pigliucci, M., Boudry, M. (eds.), 2013. Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, USA. pp. 1–482.
  12. [12] Thagard, P.R., 1978. Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. 1978(1), 223–234.
  13. [13] Hansson, S.O., 2013. Defining Pseudoscience and Science. In: Pigliucci, M., Boudry, M. (eds.). Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, USA. pp. 61–77.
  14. [14] Boudry, M., Braeckman, J., 2011. Immunizing strategies and epistemic defense mechanisms. Philosophia. 39(1), 145–161. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9254-9
  15. [15] Feyerabend, P., 1975. Against method, 3rd ed. Verso: London, UK. pp. 1–284.
  16. [16] Oberheim, E., 2016. Rediscovering Einstein’s legacy: how Einstein anticipates Kuhn and Feyerabend on the nature of science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 57, 17–26. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.11.005
  17. [17] Heller, L., 2016. Between relativism and pluralism: philosophical and political relativism in Feyerabend’s late work. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 57, 96–105. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.11.011
  18. [18] Kidd, I.J., 2016. Why did Feyerabend defend astrology? Integrity, virtue, and the authority of science. Social Epistemology. 30(4), 464–482. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2015.1031851
  19. [19] Hacking, I., 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
  20. [20] Chakravartty, A., 2017. Scientific Realism. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/scientific-realism/ (cited 15 April 2025).
  21. [21] Merton, R.K., 1973. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, USA.
  22. [22] Bourdieu, P., Nice, R., 2004. Science of Science and Reflexivity. Polity: Cambridge, UK.
  23. [23] McIntyre, L., 2018. Post-Truth. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA.
  24. [24] McIntyre, L., 2019. The Scientific Attitude: Defending Science from Denial, Fraud, and Pseudoscience. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA.
  25. [25] Sagan, C., 1997. The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark, Reprint ed. Ballantine Books: New York, NY, USA.
  26. [26] Barnes, B., Payette, P., 2017. Teaching for critical thinking: Carl Sagan’s baloney detection kit. The National Teaching & Learning Forum. 26(2), 7–9. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/ntlf.30102
  27. [27] Hayon, A.L., 2024. Bruce Nauman: Performative Scepticism and the Aporia of Sense. De Gruyter: Berlin, Germany. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110664133
  28. [28] Boudry, M., Braeckman, J., 2012. How convenient! The epistemic rationale of self-validating belief systems. Philosophical Psychology. 25(3), 341–364. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.579420
  29. [29] Orwell, G., 1946. Politics and the English Language. The Orwell Foundation. Available from: https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/politics-and-the-english-language/ (cited 15 April 2025).
  30. [30] Sokal, A., 2010. Beyond the Hoax: Science, Philosophy and Culture. OUP Oxford: Oxford, UK.
  31. [31] Goodwin, J., 2011. Accounting for the appeal to the authority of experts. Argumentation. 25(3), 285–296. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9219-6
  32. [32] Nickerson, R.S., 1998. Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology. 2(2), 175–220. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175
  33. [33] Festinger, L., 1962. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, USA.
  34. [34] Dasti, M.R., 2012. Parasitism and disjunctivism in Nyāya epistemology. Philosophy East and West. 62(1), 1–15. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2012.0012
  35. [35] Almossawi, A., Giraldo, A., 2014. An Illustrated Book of Bad Arguments. The Experiment: New York, NY, USA.
  36. [36] Resnik, D.B., 2000. A pragmatic approach to the demarcation problem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 31(2), 249–267. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0039-3681(00)00004-2
  37. [37] Haack, S., 2007. Defending Science—Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism. Prometheus: Amherst, NY, USA.
  38. [38] Hansson, S.O., 2017. Science denial as a form of pseudoscience. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. 63, 39–47. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.05.002
  39. [39] Oreskes, N., Conway, E.M., 2011. Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, Reprint ed. Bloomsbury Publishing PLC: London, UK.
  40. [40] Altman, D.G., Bland, J.M., 1995. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. BMJ. 311(7003), 485. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.311.7003.485
  41. [41] Osimani, B., 2013. The precautionary principle in the pharmaceutical domain: a philosophical enquiry into probabilistic reasoning and risk aversion. Health, Risk & Society. 15(2), 123–143. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698575.2013.771736
  42. [42] Widmer, D., 2015. Philosophical roots of quaternary prevention. Revista Brasileira de Medicina de Família e Comunidade. 10(35), 1–8. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5712/rbmfc10(35)1128
  43. [43] Ernst, E., 2002. A systematic review of systematic reviews of homeopathy. British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology. 54(6), 577–582. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2125.2002.01699.x
  44. [44] Godlee, F., Smith, J., Marcovitch, H., 2011. Wakefield’s article linking MMR vaccine and autism was fraudulent. BMJ. 342, c7452. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.c7452
  45. [45] Singh, S., Ernst, E., 2008. Trick or Treatment? Alternative Medicine on Trial. Bantam: London, UK.
  46. [46] Wall, L.L., 2006. The medical ethics of Dr J Marion Sims: a fresh look at the historical record. Journal of Medical Ethics. 32(6), 346–350. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.2005.012559
  47. [47] Kevles, D.J., 1985. In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity. Alfred A. Knopf: New York, NY, USA.
  48. [48] Rossianov, K.O., 1993. Editing nature: Joseph Stalin and the "new" Soviet biology. Isis. 84(4), 728–745. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/356638
  49. [49] Lexchin, J., Bero, L.A., Djulbegovic, B., et al., 2003. Pharmaceutical industry sponsorship and research outcome and quality: Systematic review. BMJ. 326(7400), 1167–1170. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.326.7400.1167
  50. [50] Boudry, M., Braeckman, J., 2012. How convenient! The epistemic rationale of self-validating belief systems. Philosophical Psychology. 25(3), 341–364. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.579420
  51. [51] Kahan, D.M., 2017. Misconceptions, misinformation, and the logic of identity-protective cognition. Cultural Cognition Project Working Paper Series No. 164. Yale Law School. Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2973067 (cited 15 April 2025).
  52. [52] Ernst, E., 2008. Trick or Treatment: The Undeniable Facts about Alternative Medicine. W. W. Norton & Company: New York, NY, USA.
  53. [53] Nguyen, C.T., 2020. Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme. 17(2), 141–161. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.32
  54. [54] Abrami, P.C., Bernard, R.M., Borokhovski, E., et al., 2015. Strategies for teaching students to think critically: a meta-analysis. Review of Educational Research. 85(2), 275–314. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3102/0034654314551063
  55. [55] Van Der Linden, S., Leiserowitz, A., Rosenthal, S., et al., 2017. Inoculating the public against misinformation about climate change. Global Challenges. 1(2), 1600008. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/gch2.201600008

How to Cite

André Demambre Bacchi. Performative Skepticism: Pseudoscientific Dogmatism Under the Veil of Rhetorical Doubt. Philosophy and Realistic Reflection. 25 April 2025. https://doi.org/10.55121/prr.v2i1.455
Citation formats

Copyright & License

Copyright © 2025 André Demambre Bacchi. Published by Japan Bilingual Publishing Co..

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Article Metrics

1,207Abstract views
976Downloads