How to Be Things with Words: Speech Acts and the Ontological Symmetry Between Realism and Idealism

Authors

  • Euclides Souza *

    Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Paraiba, Joao Pessoa 58050-585, Brazil

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55121/prr.v2i2.493

Keywords:

Ontology, Language, Speech Acts, Performativity, Idealism, Realism, Mind

Abstract

This article challenges the traditional separation between language and ontology by arguing that they are fundamentally co-constitutive. Drawing from Speech Act Theory—particularly in its development by Austin, Searle, and Vanderveken—it demonstrates that language is not merely a vehicle for describing reality, but a generative force that constitutes ontological status through declarative and performative acts. Building on this framework, the paper critiques Quine’s early attempt (On What There Is, 1948) to isolate ontological commitment from linguistic practice, showing that even denial presupposes referential invocation. It further examines Word and Object (1960), where Quine acknowledges that reference and meaning are shaped by conceptual schemes, suggesting greater affinity with SAT than his earlier stance implies. Beyond the construction of institutional facts, the article defends a broader claim: that even so-called natural or physical facts are only intelligible through mental-linguistic mediation. Integrating insights from phenomenology, the philosophy of mind (Metzinger, Chalmers, Nagel), and non-Western ontologies (Buddhist pratītyasamutpāda, Ubuntu), the article demonstrates that no access to being is possible without an act of saying. Ontology does not precede language—it emerges with it. By repositioning SAT as a metaphysical framework rather than a linguistic tool, the paper proposes a model in which saying and being are inseparable operations. Language is not posterior to the world—it is what makes the world available to us as world.

References

[1] Quine, W.V., 1950. On what there is. The review of metaphysics (New Haven), vol. 2 no. 5 (1948), pp. 21–38. Journal of Symbolic Logic. 15(2), 152–153. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2267012

[2] Wittgenstein, L., 1984. Investigações filosóficas. Trad. José Carlos Bruni. 3. ed. Abril Cultural: São Paulo, Brazil. (in Portuguese)

[3] Austin, J.L., 1990. Quando dizer é fazer. Trad. de Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho. Artes Médicas: Porto Alegre, Brazil. (in Portuguese)

[4] Cohen, L.J., 1964. Do illocutionary forces exist? Philosophical Quarterly. 14(55), 118–137. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2955549

[5] Vanderveken, D., 1990. Meaning and speech acts: volume I. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY, USA.

[6] Cappelen, H., Lepore, E., 2005. Insensitive semantics. Blackwell: Hoboken, NJ, USA.

[7] Travis, C., 2002. The uses of sense: Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.

[8] Habermas, J., 1984. The theory of communicative action. Beacon Press: Boston, MA, USA.

[9] Brandom, R., 1994. Making it explicit. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA.

[10] Searle, J., Vanderveken, D., 1985. Foundations of illocutionary logic. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY, USA.

[11] Frege, G., 1956. The thought: a logical inquiry. In: Geach, P., Black, M. (eds.). Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege. Basil Blackwell: Oxford, UK. pp. 289–311.

[12] Searle, J., 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY, USA.

[13] Putnam, H., 1981. Reason, truth and history. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY, USA.

[14] Dummett, M., 1978. Truth and other enigmas. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA.

[15] Varzi, A.C., 2007. From language to ontology: beware of the traps. In: Aurnague, M. (eds.). The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.

[16] Echeverria, R., 2003. Ontologia del lenguaje. 7th ed. J. C. Sáez: Santiago, Chile.

[17] Thomasson, A.L., 2015. Ontology made easy. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.

[18] Epstein, B., 2015. The ant trap: rebuilding the foundations of the social sciences. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.

[19] Searle, J.R., 2010. Making the social world: the structure of human civilization. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.

[20] Metzinger, T., 2009. The ego tunnel: the science of the mind and the myth of the self. Basic Books: New York, NY, USA.

[21] Nagel, T., 1974. What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review. 83(4), 435–450.

[22] Chalmers, D.J., 1996. The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA.

[23] Derrida, J., 1988. Signature event context. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, IL, USA. pp. 1–25.

[24] Garfield, J.L., 1995. The fundamental wisdom of the middle way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.

[25] Ramose, M.B., 1999. African philosophy through Ubuntu. Mond Books: Harare, Zimbabwe.

[26] Wiredu, K., 1980. Philosophy and an African culture. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY, USA.

[27] Quine, W.V.O., 1960. Word and object. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA.

Downloads

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 2 (December 2025): In Progress

Section

Articles

License

Copyright (c) 2025 Euclides Souza

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.